The privative adjective is used thus widely also in Pr 27"°', but here the universe of discourse is distinctly mentioned {oi dTraiSevroi aKparels yXuiaarj, ' unrestrained in speech ' ; cf. 4 Mac ."5"^ for a con- junction of the same ideas of training and self- control — ou \f/evaojj.ai ffe, Traideura p6jx€, qv8^ rpeui^o/xai at, <pi\ri i-fKp6,Teia). St. Paul has the same ideas in Tit 2'^, but to him the source of true iraiSela is not the Law but the grace of God ; yet in both cases the influence of training is recognized, and training here includes both the Aristotelian /idffijtris and d<7Kr)ffis (Diog. Laert. v. 18). It is striking how large a vocabulary St. Paul has for sins of s|peech (cf. St. James also), and in the only place where lie uses aKparets, side by side with it occurs Sici/JoXoi (2 Ti 3'). Perhaps the reason for this emphasis on such sins is that these have always been a peculiar failing of the East.
As a strict terminus ethicus, however, iyKpireia, as Aristotle points out, was restricted to control over the sensual desires — the desires for food, drink, and sexual indulgence. Similar to this is the usage in Sir 18'"-19', a passage which is headed Eyd-pdreia i/'i'x^s- There gluttonous luxury {TptKpri), wine, and women (oli'oj Kal ywalKe^) are condemned. ' Wine and women will make men of understanding to fall away : and he that cleaveth to harlots will be the more reckless' (19-). The jiassage may well be contrasted with 2 P P"". In the one passage we have the advance in virtue of the man who makes provision (inxopvyiitraTe) for the develop- ment of faith ; in the other, the descent in vice of him who makes provision (xo/)i;7^(reis) for his lusts.
TEMPERANCE
TEMPERANCE
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Even inside this domain of sens\ial desires tlie word difi'ersfrom aoiippoavvr), with wliich in popular speech it was often identified, for the latter indicates not only that a man has control of his passions, but that he has an easy mastery over them, lunppoavv-q I'xtenilsalso to the highest faculties of man, which iyKpareia when accurately used does not. In the aiiijipuv the ])assions are entirelj- harmonized with one another and unitedly under the persuasive hegemony of the reason, tlie more violent passions being thus excluded. On the other hand, the ifKpaTi^s is subject to strong desires, which he can control only with ditliculty and etlbrt. This use of iyKparaa agi'ees well with the manner in whicli St. Paul describes those Corinthians whose lusts were as a hidden fire or the heathen who burned towards one another in lust.
"EyKpdTda is tlius lower in the moral scale than atjiippoavri} but higher than axoXacria (a term not found in the NT). The dKdXaurot has definitely adopted pleasure as his good and pursues it with- out qualms of conscience. The dxpaT^s knows what is right, but either his passions are too strong for him or he sophisticates his reason into thinking that in any particular action the doing of it is good for him. He may be compared to a State which passes good legislation but does not carry it out. The iyKpa-r/js would carry it out by force if necessary. His morality at times may be a police and military morality, whereas the aJ^ppuiv may be compared to a State in which the citizens obey good laws instinctively and lovingly without the necessity of force, where right is followed easily because it is right. Aristotle also draws moral distinctions inside this virtue itself, saying that the incontinence of anger is not so bad as that of premeditated lust. The one is a momentary impulse, the other is crafty, full of stratagems in order to gratify the ' goddess of the Cyprian isle, artisan of many a wile.' There is no doubt that this is true. St. Paul when he lost his temper before the high priest was not so culpable as David in the<;ase of Bathsheba, though both were guilty of a breach of iyKparca. We have a conspicuous example of temperance in Joseph in Potiphar's house, where everything conspired against him to test his self-control. The Greek moralist recog- nizes also those who are incontinent by heredity, by temperament, and by habit. In the discussion of this virtue the Greek thinker came face to face with the problem which confronted St. Paul also (Ro 7) — the problem of moral inability (axpaala). ' How can any one with a right conception of duty be incontinent?' This is the standing moral difh- culty of Greek ethics, and indeed of all ethics. In the letter of Aristeas a similar question is asked : ' Why do not the majority of men take possession of virtue?' and it is answered thus — on rpvcnKU! Hiravres cLKpaTeis Kdl ^tri rets T^Sovds Tpetrdfj-evot yeydvaaiv (H. B. Swete, Introdtiction to the OT in Greek, London, 1900, p. 567). Socrates and Plato tried to solve the problem as one of knowledge ; hence their insi-stence on a right education, because to them ' Vice is Ignorance.' Aristotle sees deeper : He maintains that the Socratic view is contrary to experience, but on the whole his solution of the moral prolileru is intellectual (Eudem. Eth. vii. 111). But how lame this is when it is contrasted with St. Paul's view ! The exceeding sinfulness of sin, the rebellion of the will against law, even Divine law, the bitter cry, ' O wretched man that I am ! ' all reveal how deep Christian insight goes in its diagnosis of the moral condition of man ; but this only in order to show the radicalness of the needed cure, the great- ness of the moral regenerating power issuing from the Redeemer, and the glory of the deliverance efiected for man and in man by Him. Greek thinkers were always prone to solve moral diffi-