The name originating in this way in the schools of medicine was readilj' transferred to the corresponding procedure in other departments of knowledge. Em- piricism is opposed to science in the same vcsiy that a paralogism is opposed to a syllogism : it is the abuse, or the imperfect use of a procedure which is valid when correcth' pursued. It is confused observation devel- oped into unreliable induction. But the distortion of the process, and the consequent degradation of the word denoting the process, evince the partial agree- ment between empiricism and scientific reasoning. It becomes, therefore, expedient to point out mora ex- plicitly the relation which observation and experience bear to theory, or philosophical reasoning.
Science is the systematic co-ordination of observed facts, and the exhibition of their dependence upon general principles. Observation collects particulars, which should be compared and tested, so as to elimi- nate all discrepancies and all accidental agreements, and to disentangle from the complex phenomena the single point of positive and hal)itual concordance. Whsn this is adequate]}^ achieved, the regular associ- ation of the facts under consideration is estaLli>hed. This, however, provides only what Bacon designates axiomata media — those inductions which ascertain the character and direct connections of the phenomena. A further generalization is required ; these intermedi- ate axioms must be traced to precise laws. Such is the nature and procedure of strict inductive science, with which empiricism is more immediately contrast- ed, though it arose originally out of the antagonism to dogmatic deduction. The empiric disregards these careful comparisons and gradual approximations, and leaps at once from looseh'-observed data, from casual coincidences, or from a few disconnected instances to a general conclusion. He has no principle to restrain him, no recognised law for his guidance. From the absence of all certainty, and the consequent liability to error, empiricism has come to denote rash and ig- norant generalization leading to hazardous and unrea- soning applications.
Another important point demands attention. Cer- tain phenomena are so complex and so inapprehensible by the processes of rigid observation, comparison, and experiment, tiiat they scarcely admit of rigorously sci- entific treatment. Moreover, from the want of oppor- tunity for applying the methods of science, and from the multiplicity of concurrent, interacting, and irregu- larly varying influences involved in the jiroduction of the result, scientific induction and philosophical deduc- tion fail to include or to exclude everj'thing which should be embraced or rejected. The sul)ject either does not yet admit of scientific treatment, but must be governed liy the suggestions of unanalyzed experi- ence, or there is a large discordance between the sci- entific conclusions and the^ observed facts. In these cases the indications of experience cannot be disre- garded, and the procedure, to be adopted, must be in greater or less measure empirical. History, politics.
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social organization, agriculture, and many of the aj>- plications of physical science to human requirements demand, in a greater or less degree, this subordination of scientific results to observed facts. But the insuffi- ciency of the procedure should be recognised ; for em- piricism, even in its most favorable form, is tentative and problematical, because it is the renunciation of the guidance of the reason, and the acceptance of imper- fect or imperfectly-digested observation for the pre- scri])tions of ascertained and immutable law. Em- piricism is available only in consimili casu ; and, as this exact similitude can never be assured, but is always precarious, it is necessarilj- attended with insecurity. If the conditions or concomitances varj' so as to mod- ify the result, it is a blind leader of the blind. The only protection in changed circumstances, or under novel conditions, is a knowledge of the general princi- ples which govern the facts, and this knowledge is ob- tained onh' from science, inductive or deductive. The- ory and experience have distinct but associated func- tions : theory is the abstract rationale of the phenom- ena; experience is their undiscriminating representa- tion : theorj' degenerates into rash inexperience when not checked by careful obser\^tion ; experience runs into wild and pernicious fantasies when not illumina- ted by speculative discernment. The two must be combined and conciliated in order to afford any abso- lute contidenee in the rectitude of our conclusions, and the procedure founded thereon. If they be separated, and to the extent to which they are separated, experi- ence is valid only in matters of mere routine ; theory or science is always required under novel combina- tions. Theory, unregulated by experience, is as ar- bitrary and capricious as experience unenlightened \)y reason, and misleads hopelessly, because it never awakens anj' suspicion of the possibility of error. But theory, which systematizes the conclusions drawn from an adequate range and degree of observation, furnishes guidance under all changes of circumstance ; while empiricism only misleads and betrays in every case •when it is necessarj' to deviate in any respect from a procedure already adopted and approved.
Empiricism is thus at all times an irrational pro- cedure, though it may furnish a practical rule within a very limited sphere. Theory may beguile, in conse- quence of its imperfect constitution or rash applica- tion, but is always requisite to insure the recognition of established law, and obedience to the immutable prescriptions of reason in the individual or in the order of creation. An empirical procedure ma)' often be in- dispensable, but, when most necessary, it is provisional only. A theoretical procedure may be demanded be- fore adequate experience has been acquired, but this miist be conlirmed or reformed by the observation of facts. It is only when tlieory is sustained by facts, and facts are explained l)y theory, that knowledge be- comes entirely trustworthy. Many departments of practical knowledge are not yet, and may never be, capable of thorough scientific organization. In these we must continue to be guided by empirical conclu- sions ; but they are received, not because the}' are suf- ficient, but because nothing better is attainalile. Em- piricism is, therefore, always inadequate, and usually deceptive. (G. F. H.)