Hegel's influence upon the philosophy and theology of Germany has been x^ry great. It is impossible, in brief space, to give a full idea of the HegeUan system. "The transcendental idealism of Kant formed the tran- sition from the empiricism of the 18tli centiuy, and ef- fected, as it were, a compromise between the ancient realism and the scepticism of Hume. To the system of Kant succeeded the pure and absolute idealism of Fichte, destined to be displaced in its turn by ScheUing's sys- tem of absolute identity and intellectual intmtion, which was itself to be further modified and developed l)y the dialectical momentum of Hegel. Essentially the systems of Hegel and Schelling arc both founded on the same principle, namely, the absolute ideality of tlKJuglit and being; for thare is evidently but little difference be- tween the doctrine of Schelling, which supposed that the human mind contained within it the fulness of real- ity and truth, the consciousness of which it may attain to simply by contemplating its o^\ni nature, anil that of Hegel, according to whom the concrete notion, or the reason, comprises within itself all verity, and that, in or- der to arrive at the science thereof, it is only necossarj' to employ logical tliouglit, or dialectic. The difterence is piurely a difference of method. For the rigoi-ous for-
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malism of Fichte, Schelling had substituted a sort of poetical enthusiasm, and, banisliing from philosophy the scientific form it had received from Wolff, had intro- duced into it the rapturous mysticism of the intellectual intuition. Hegel, however, insisting that the scientific system is the only form under which truth can exist, re-estabUshed the rights and utility of method by his doctrine of the dialectical momentum, or development of the idea. Indeed, with Hegel the method of philos- ophy is philosophy itself. This he defines to he the knowledge oitfie evolution, of the concrete. The concrete is the idea, which, as a unity, is diversely determined, and has in itself the principle of its activity. The or- igin of the activity, the action itself, and the residt are one, and constitute the concrete. Its movement is the development by which that which exists merely poten- tially is reaUzed. The concrete in itself, or virtually, must become actual; it is simple, yet different. This inherent contradiction of the concrete is the spring of its development. Hence arise differences, which, how- ever, idtiraately vanish into unity. There is both move- ment, and repose in the movement. The difference scarcely becomes apparent before it disappears, where- upon there issues from it a fidl and concrete unity. Of this he gives the following illustration : the flower, not- withstanding its many qualities, is one; no single qual- ity that belongs to it is wanting in the smallest of its leaves, and every portion of the leaf possesses the same properties as the entire leaf. He then observes that although this union of qualities in sensible objects is readily admitted, it is denied in immaterial objects, and held to be irreconcilable. Thus it is said that man pos- sesses liberty, but that freedom and necessity are mu- tually opposed ; that the one exclutUng the other, they can never be united so as to become concrete. But, ac- cording to Hegel, the mind is in reality concrete, and its qualities are liberty and necessity. It is by neces- sity that man is free, and it is only in necessity that he experiences liberty. The objects of nature are, it is true, subject exclusively to necessity; but liberty with- out necessity is an arbitrary abstraction, a purely formal libertj'" {English Cycloptedia, s. v.).
Hegel "rejected the intellectual intuition of the phi- losophy of nature, and studied to make philosophy an inteUigible science and knowledge by means of dialec- tics. He called philosophy the Science of Reason, l.>e- cause it is the idea and consciousness of all esse in its necessary development. It is his principle to include all particular principles in it. Now as the Idea is rea- son identical with itself, and as, in order to be cognizant of itself, or, in other words, as, in order to be self-exist- ing {fur sich seyn), it places itself in opposition to it- self, so as to appear something else, without, however, ceasing to be one and the same thing; in this case phi- losophy becomes divided : 1. Into logic considered as the science of the Idea in and for itself. 2. Into the philos- ophy of nature considered as the science of the Idea representing itself externally (reason thrown out in na- ture). 5. Its third division is that of the philosophy of mind, expressing the return of the Idea within itself, after having thrown itself without externally. All log- ic, according to Hegel, presents three momentums: 1. The abstract or intelligible momentum, which seizes the object in its most distinct and determinate features, and distinguishes it with precision. 2. The dialectic or negative rational momentum consists in the annihila- tion of the determinations of objects, and their transi- tion to the opposite determinations. 3. The speculative momentum perceives the unity of the determinations in their opposition. Such is the method which philosophy ought to follow, and which is frequently styled by He- gel the immanent movement, the spontaneous develop- ment of the conception. Logic is essentially specula- tive philosophy because it considers the determinations of thought in and for itself, consequently of concrete and pure thoughts, or, in other words, the conceptions, with the significations of the self-subsisting foundation