Hugo OF St. Yictor, said to have been count of Blankenburg, Avas born at Ein, near Yprcs, about 1097, and educated in the couA-ent of Hammersleben, near Halberstadt. When eiglitccn years of age he Avcnt to Paris, and joined the Augustines of St.Yictor. He next became professorof theology, and his success as a teach- er and Avriter Avas very brilliant. He died at Paris about 1141. Hugo Avas the most .spiritual theologian of his time, and the precursor of the later Mystics. He rec- ommended the use of the Bible for private de\otioii, and urged also its study on priests and teaclicrs. He fol- lowed the theology of Augustine so strictly, and ex- pounded it so succcssfidly, that he Avas called -4 ugusline the Second, and the Mouth of A ugustine. '• In Hugo we see the representative of a school distinguished in the 12th century for its hearty religious spirit, and its tend- ency to practical reform ; a school Avhich, though it uni- ted" more or less the mystico-contemplative Avith the speculative element, yet constantly kept up the contest
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with the predominant dialectic tendency of the times. If, in Abelard, we see those spiritual tendencies which had been harmoniously uniteil by Anselm, brought into conflict with each other, we see them once more recon- ciled in Hugo, but with this difference, that in him the dialectical element is not so strong as it was in Anselm. In his doctrinal investigations, lie often has reference to, and contends against Abelard, though without mention- ing his name. The empirical department of knowledge generally, and in theology the study of the older Church teachers, and of the Bible, was made specially promi- nent by Hugo, in opposition to one-sided speculation and innovating influences. His princijile was, ' Study every- thing; thou wilt afterwards see that nothing is super- fluous.' Adopting the definition of faith in the eleventh chajiter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, he remarks, 'Faith is called the substance of things invisible, be- cause tliat which, as yet, is not an object of open vision, is by faith, in a certain sense, made present to the soul ^-actually dwells in it. Nor is there anything else whereby the things of God could be demonstrated, since they are higher than all others ; nothing resembles them wliich coidd serve us as a bridge to that higher knowl- edge.' Hence lie declared tliat, in regard to the essence of true faith, much more depends on the degree of devo- tion than on the extent of knowledge; for divine grace <loes not look at the amount of knowledge united with faith, but at the degree of de\-otion with which that which constitutes the object of faith is loved" (compare Trench, Sac. Lat. Poi'trij, p. 54). In the struggle then raging between scholasticism (Bernhard) and mysticism (Abelard), Hugo inclined rather to mysticism; but, in- stead of favoring exclusively tlie one, he aimed rather at combining the two antagonistic doctrines, and gi\'ing birth to a new system, containing the better elements of both. It is for this reason that we oftentimes find one or the other of these doctrines quite promiscuously advocated in his writings. A tolerably accurate idea of Hugo's own di)ctriucs, and of the pecidiarities of his sys- tem, may be obtained by a study of his Summa senten- tiarum. In man, says he, there is a threefold eye: the bodily eye, for visible things ; the eye of reason, which enables man to see his own soul and its faculties; and the eye of contemplation, to view divine things. But by sin the eye of contemplation has become blinded, so that faith, which has the advantage of realizing with- out seeing, comes in its stead, and is the organ of the knowledge of the superterrestrial ; while the eye of rea- son is not so greatly obscured as to excuse man's ig- norance of divine things. Thus he acutelj' distinguishes between what is possible to be known ex ratione, the "necessaria" (natural laws), and what secundum ration- em, the " probabilia," as well as what lies svpra ration- em, the "mirabilia" (divine things), and what must be acknowledged to be contra rationem, the " incredibilia." Subject to knowledge are the necessaria, subject to faith the jyrohabilia and mirethilia. Faith, he continues, is supported bj' reason, reason is ]icrrcct('il l)y faith. The certainty of faith is suiicrinr (o (i;iiiiiiiii, Imt not to knowledge ; still scire quod ijisimi sif mu^t ] irccede faith ; after I'aith comes intelliyere quid ipsinii sit. Purity of heart and prayer lead upon the steps of corjitatio, medi- tatio, and contemplatio, gradually to this higher intui- tion, which affords a real foretaste of heaven itself (com- pare Ebrard, Ildhuch. d. Kirch, v. Dogmen-Gesch. ii, 220). In his Be saci-amentis Jidei, treating of redemption, he regards man as the end of creation, and God as the end of man. In the doctrine of the attributes of God, he considers, like Abelard, power, wisdom, and goodness as primary', but contradicts Abelard in his view that what God does is the limit of his omnipotence. With An- selm, he seeks to exhibit the doctrine of the Trinity by analogy with the human spirit. Spirit, Avisdom, and love, says he, correspond to the three divine persons ; but, while human wisdom and affection are liable to changes, the divine are not. On the doctrine of the will, he modified Augustine slightly. He distinguishes, in