In the theory of IMalebranche, body and spirit, being totally disjoined from each other, and incapable of in- tercommunication, can be brought into harmonious — and, indeed, into possible — co-operation only by the in- tervention of a higher nature. As knowledge, accord- ing to the postulate of Des Cartes, is the substance and the evidence of intelligible existence, supreme knowl- edge or omniscience must be the attribute and exclusive property of the only Absolute Existence. All things, therefore, primarily exist in the Divine jMind and in the Divine Contemplation ; and their genuine, as well as their original, reality is as the archetypal idea of the Divine Intelligence. Temporal existences, with their alterations and combinations, proceed from the divine aspiration. All their forms, modes, habits, changes — separately, and in the intricate dance of spiritual and material nnUations and complications — are presented and revealed to the gaze of other intelligences only in the mirror of (Jod's mind. This is not very remote from the Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz, but it is much nearer to the infinite effluxes of the (iodhead in Spinoza. It is only in their divine types that we contemplate the marvels of sublunarj' change, receive impressions from without, and regulate our actions accordingly. We see all things in God — and all material motions concurrent with our will arc produced, as on the Cartesian system, l)y divine inten-ention. All our percej)tions and sensa- tions, apparently excited by extrinsic stimulations, are due to divine action. The extrinsic object is perceived, not in itself, nor even in its sensililc image; Imt the sen- sible image is only the reticTtion of the idea abiding in the mind of God. Thus man, and man's sensibilities, are not the cause, the immediate cause at least, of his perceptions or of his actions; but they are only the oc- casion of God's revealing that perception through the
idea subsisting in himself, or of his impelling to the ac- tion which may ensue frtm the conception, but without actual dependence upon it. '' Non sentement les hommes ne sont point les veritables causes des mouvcments qu'ils produisent dans leurs corps; il semble meme qu'il v ait contradiction qu'ils puissent I'etre. ... II n'y a que Dieu qui soit veritable cause, et qui est veritablement la puissance de mouvoir les corjjs" {Trait e de Morale, liv. vi, p"' ii, ch. iii).
The cardinal doctrine of Malebranche is all that pre- ser\'es enduring interest, and that needs concern us here. It gained only a verj' limited and temporary acceptance. Its invalidity was almost immediately and intuitively recognised, and it was soon supplanted by other schemes of like character and of like frailty, or was hustled out of consideration by wholly contradictor}' doctrines. It may again return unexpectedly in other forms, but in its own Cartesian garb it has passed away forever. Its applications and developments, ingenious as they are, and animated as they are with a spirit of pure and deep devotion, have few special claims to attention. JIany valuable counsels, many stimulating and comforting ex- hortations, many precious exhortations for the guidance of our investigations, our feelings, and our conduct, are presented in the graceful and perspicuous expositions of the serene-tempered and heavenly-minded philosopher, whose heart saw all things in God, if his metajdiysics failed to prove that vision of the divinity to be the sole possible mode of linite thought and action. His moral system was directly founded on his cardinal tenet, and feO with it. He referred all virtue to the recognition and love of the universal order as it exists eternally in the Divine Reason, where everj' created reason contem- plates it. There is some analogy between this view- and the ennobling reflections of Donoso Cortes; but it is open to the objections made by Sir James i\Iackintosh, and to others which he has not made. IMakbrancbe, however, merits the praise of the same just and discrim- inating critic, that "he is perhaps the first philosojilKr who has precisely laid down and rigidly adhered to the principle that virtue 'consists in pure intentions and dispositions of mind, without which actions, however conformable to rules, are not truly moral' " — a thesis de- veloped, and perhaps degraded, by Paley.
The further criticism of Blalebranche's M-ritings is unnecessary', though they merited a formal refutation by Locke, a rectification and a partial acceptance by Leibnitz. " Quod ad controversiam attinct, utrimi omnia videamus in Deo (ipia; utique vetus est sententia, et, si sano sensu intelligatur, non onmino sperncnda), an vero proprias ideas habeamus, sciendum est, et si omnia in Deo videamus, necesse tamen est ut habeamus et ideas proprias" .... {Meditatioms, 1G84 ; Opera Ed. Ihttens. tom. ii, p' i, p. 12 ; comp. Lettre a M. Montmort, Nov. 4, 1715; ibid. p. 217).
Thus Malebranche is admitted into honorable and lasting conjunction with the illustrious names of Spino- za, Locke, and Leibnitz; and, sharing in the light in which they lived, he participated in moulding the in- fluences which formed the succeeding generation of bold and curious metaphysical inquirers, and left behind the memorj' and the example of an earnest, sincere, and ir- reproachable existence. The other productions of Mal- eliranche were partly controversial and partly religious. Of the latter we may mention the Entretitm d'lin I'hi- hisvphe Chretien et d'lin Philosophe Chinois sur la Nature de Dieu (Paris, 1708) -.-De la Nature et de la Grace (Amsterdam, IGSO) : — Eiilretiens sur la Metaphiifique et sur la Reliijion (Kotterd. 1688; of a mystical character, blending religion with metaphysics). A comi'lete edi- tion of his works was published at Paris, 1712, in 11 vols, 12mo; new edition by Genoude and Lourdoueix, 1837, 2 vols, 8vo,