to determine his will than it can be an argument to de- termine his judgment." "This is Aristotle's definition (to tvEKa oil) of end or final cause; and as a synonyme for end or final cause the terra motive had been long exclusively employed" (Sir Wm. Hamilton). In Dr. Keid's Essays on the A ctive Foweis he says, " Every- thing that can be called a nwtive is addressed either to the animal or the rational part of our nature." Here the word motive is applied objectively to those external things which, when contemplated, affect our intelli- gence or our sensitivity. But in the ver}' next sen- tence he has said, 'hnotives of the former kind are com- mon to us with the brutes." Here the word motive is ' applied subjectively to those internal principles of our nature — such as appetite, desire, passion, etc. — which are excited by the contemplation of external objects, adapted and addressed to them. But, in order to a more precise use of the term motive, let it be noted that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly distin- guishable, although it may not be common nor easy always to speak of them distinctively. Tliese are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For example, bread or food of any kind is the external object, which is adapted to an infernal principle which is called appetite, and hunger or the desire for food is the internal feeling, which is excited or allayed, as the circumstances may be, by the present- ment of the external object to the internal principle. In popular language, the term motive might be applied to any one of these three ; and it might be said that the motive for such an action was bread, appetite, or hunger. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the motive; it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The same may be said of motives of every kind. In every case there may be ob- served the external object, the internal princi|ile, and the resultant state or affection of mind ; and the term . motive may be applied, separately and successively, to any one of them ; but, speaking strictly, it should be applied to the determining state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it ; because it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action. The motive of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have been injury, or resentment, or anger — meaning by the first of these words Uie wrong behavior of another; by the second, the principle in human nature affected by such behavior; and b}' the third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is said that a man acleA prudently, this may intimate that his conduct was in accordance with the rules of propri- ety and prudence; or that he adopted it after careful consideration and forethought, or from a sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a man acted conscientiously, it may mean that the particular action was regarded not as a matter of interest, but of duty, or that his moral faculty approved of it as right, or that he felt himself under a sense of obligation to do it. In all these cases the term motive is strictly applicable to the terminating state or affection of mind which immedi- ately precedes the volition or determination to act. To the question, therefore, whether motive means some- thing in the mind or out of it, it is replied that what moves the will is something in the preceding state of mind. The state of mind may have reference to some- thing outi of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated — must be brought within the view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that external objects or circumstances can be called motives, or be said to move the will. Motives are, strictly speaking, subjective — as they are internal states or affections of mind in the agent. Motives may be called subjective, not only in contradistinction to the
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extemal objects and circumstances which may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different ef- fect which the same objects and circumstances may- have, not only upon ditrercnt individuals, but even upon the same individuals, at different times. A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive the value or importance of an object when presented to him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that may be i)oiiitcd out to liim, so clearly or so quickly as a man of large and vigorous intellect. The conse- quence will be tliat, with the same motives (ohjectivelij considered) presented to them, the one may remain in- different and indolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections will con- template a spectacle of pain or want without feeling any desire or making any exertion to relieve it; while he whose sensibilities are more acute and lively will in- stantly be moved to the most active and generous ef- forts. An injury done to one man will rouse liim at once to a frenzy of indignation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge ; while in another man it will only give rise to a moderate feeling of resentment. An action which will be contemplated with horror by a man of tender conscience will be done without compunction by him whose moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discover between good and evil. In short, anything external to the mind will be modified in its effect ac- cording to the constitution and training of the different minds witliin the view of which it may be brought. Not only may the same objects differently affect differ- ent minds, but also the same minds, at different times or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pain of hunger may be tempted to steal in order to satisfy liis hunger, but he who has bread enough and to spare is under no such temptation. A sum of money Avhich might be sufficient to bribe one man would be no trial to the honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, considerations of prudence and pro- priety have not the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, in circumstances of dan- ger and difficulty, as those who have attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us in verj' dif- ferent colors in health and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect and in possession. It would thus a[)pear that ?«o///v.v are in their nature subjective, in their intluence irtdivid- ual, and in their issue variable.