There are two points which render this interesting topic of metaphysical philosophy or psychology also an important one in theology. See Will.
1. The Kcteiit to which Motives control Volition, — On this (piestion there are essentially two theories, (a) That the u-ill tVse//" determines the force or prevalence of the motives. This is not done by any previous voli- tion, but in the act of choosing among the various mo- tives, i. e. in selecting between the different courses to which these motives prompt. This is the only theory that leaves the will absolutely free, and fully vindicates moral character. For Cicero has long since observed that " if the things which move the will are not in our own power, then neither our actions nor our volitions are free, and there is no room for praise or blame." See LinEiJTY. (Ij) Tliat the motives control the will, so as to produce volitions according to their relative force. This is argued, either (1) on tlie materialistic (i. e. phys- ical or mechanical) ground alleged by Hobbes, Collins, and others, that there is a natural law regulating un- erringly and necessarily these processes, external and oftentimes independent of tlie sul)ject himself; or (2) on tlie basis of a moral necessity, assumed by Edwards and his followers, whereby the actual mental condition of the subject (i. e. his desires, etc.) dictates the direc- tion of tlie volitions. On the other liaiid. conscinus- ness, no less than Scri[)ture (e. g. especially Horn, vii, 15-23), mt>st miequivocally declares that we are capa-
ble of selecting a course contrarj' to our most urgent in- clinations, and conscience pronounces us guilty because we suffer our evil passions to overcome our will. Did not our judgment (otherwise called conscience or the moral sense) thus step in to cast a weight into the scale, and, moreover, were not the prevenient grace of God ever ready to aid us "both to will and to do" what is right, it might indeed remain doubtful whether the will of fallen creatures at least could freely determine in the presence of violent emotion or habitual predilec- tion. See IxABiLiTV.
The phrase " the strongest motive" contains an am- biguity which has led to great confusion in this contro- versy. If those who use it merely mean those induce- ments which are usually most efficacious in moving men, then it is irrelevant to the present issue, because some persons at all times, and all persons at some times, are proof against those influences which are most sure to incite other individuals or under other circumstances. So proverbially is this the case that human conduct is of all things the most uncertain to predict in particular cases. If, on the other hand, as is more exact, the phrase is cmploj-ed to designate those considerations which are so peculiarh^ adapted to the mental state of the person at the time as to effect an inclination of the will accordingly, then there still remains this fallacy in the expression, namely, that the strenf/th of the motives really depends upon the moral condition of the subject himself, of which condition the will itself forms a large (indeed a preponderating) element. Hence we term persons "obstinate," "stubborn," "headstrong," "self- willed," etc., or the reverse. See Yonriox.
2. The doctrine that " the character of the motives de- termines the moixil quality of an act" would be more correctly stated thus: " The ^nnpose of the actor deter- mines his moral character in any given case." There is hardh' any specific act (unless perhaps we except idolatrjO which may not be praiseworthily performed under certain circumstances and for right ends. Thus homicide may be murder or execution in altered cases ; sexual connection is the legitimate privilege of matri- mony or the illicit indulgence of licentiousness: tlie use of the name of God may be either a lawful oath, or de- vout prayer, or profanity, according to the intent of the invocation. Nor is this axiom tantamount to the maxim condemned in Scripture (Rom. iii, 8), and justly scouted under the popular name of "Jesuitism," that "the end Jiistifes the means." Not only the end in view, but all the means emploN-ed to accomplish that end, must be tested with the same scrupulous care by a comparison with the identical standard of rectitude, the revealed will of God, by which alone the moral quality of the motive of him who seeks to effect the one or make use of the other is to be ultimately and surely determined. Thus while the intention of the party acting vindicates or condemns him in the act, the propriety of the act it- self is to be tried by a more unerring external tribunal. Hence also a crime or good act meant, but (through un- avoidable hinderance) not executed, is, in the eye of di- vine justice, accounted as guilt or virtue (JIatt. v, 22, 28; 2 Cor. iii, 12; 1 John iii, 15). See Mouals.
See Edwards, On the Will, p. 7, 8, 124, 259, 384 ; Top- lady, iro?7.s, ii,41,42; Buck, Theol. Diet. s. v.; Hamil- ton, Metaphi/sics, p. G92 sq., 129, 556 sq. ; Watson, Theo- loi;ical Institutes, ii, 439 sq. ; Krauth's Fleming's ]'ocab- ulari/ of I'hilos. s. v.
Mott, William F., an American philanthropist of some note, was born in New York City in 1818. Mr. IMott commenced life with moderate means, but. being honest and of frugal habits, amassed an ample fortune, which he spent for the relief of the ]>oor and needy. He made large contriltutions to the philanthropic institu- tions of his native place; among them, to the City Dis- pensary, the House of Hefuge, the Colored Orphan Asy- lum, and Woman's Hospital. He was an active mem- ber of the Society of Friends. He died in New York in 18G7.