The Atotnists, on the other hand, held to an empty space, arguing (1) that motion requires a vacuum; (2) that rarefaction and condensation are impossible with- out empty intervals of space; and (3) that organic growth depends on the penetration of nutriment into the vacant spaces of bodies. Aristotle held that "space is limited; the world possesses only a finite extension; outside of it is no place. The place of anything," he de- fines, " is the inner surface of the body surrounding it, that surface being conceived as fixed and immovable. As nothing exists outside of the world except God, who is pure thought and not in space, the world naturally cannot be in space, i. e. its place cannot be defined." The Stoics believed that "beyond the world exists an unlimited void." According to Epicurus, "space exists from eternity, and that in the void spaces between the worlds the gods dwell." Arnobius, the African, asserted that God is "the place and space of all things." Space, as containing all tilings, was by Philo and others iden- tified with the infinite. So the text (Acts xvii, 28) which says that " in God we live, and move, and have our being" was interpreted to mean that space is an af- fection or property of the Deity. Eckhart declares that "out of God the creature is a pure nothing; time and space, and the plurality which depends on them, are nothing in themselves." According to Campanella (1568-1639), God produced space (as well as ideas, angels, etc.) "by mingling in increasing measures non- being with his pure being. Space is animate, for it dreads a vacuum and craves replenishment." Newton regards space as infinite, the seusorium of the Deity. Leibnitz defines space as "the order of possible co-exist- ing phenomena." Locke has attempted to show that " we acquire the idea of space by sensation, especially by the senses of touch an(l sight." Li the philoso|ihy of Kant, " space and time are mere forms of the sensibili- ty, the form of all external phenomena; and as the sen- sibility is necessarily anterior in the subject to all real intention, it follows that the form of all these phenom- ena is in the mind a priori. There can, then, be no question about space or extension but in a human or subjective point of view. The idea of space has no ob- jective validity; it is real only relatively to phenom- ena, to things, in so far as they appear to us; it is pure- ly ideal in so far as things are taken in themselves and considered independently of the forms of sensibility." Herder says that " space and time are empirical concep- tions." Schopenhauer teaches, with Kant, that " space, time, etc., have a purely subjective origin, and are only valid for phenomena, which are merely subjective rep- resentations in consciousness. Space and time have the peculiarity that all of their parts stand to each other in a relation, with reference to which each of them is de- termined and conditioned by another. In space this re- lation is termed position, in time it is termed sequence." Herbart holds that extension in space involves a con- tradiction. Extension implies prolongation through numerous different and distinct parts of space, but by such prolongation the one is broken up into the many, while yet the one is to be considered as identical with the many. Trendelenburg seeks to show that space is a product or phase of motion, its immediate external manifestation. In the philosopliy of Thomas Keid (1785), "space and its relations, with the axioms con- cerning its existence and its relations, are known di- rectly in connection with the senses of touch and sight, but not as objects of these senses." James Mill thus explains infinite space: "We know no infinite line, but we know a longer and a longer. ... In the process, then, by which we conceive the increase of a line the idea of one portion more is continually associated with the pre- ceding length, and to what extent soever it is carried the association of one portion more is equally close and irresistible. This is what Ave call the idea of infinite extension, and what some people call the necessai-;/ idea." According to lord ^Alonboddo, place is space occupied by body. It is different fmrn body as that
which contains is different from that which is con- tained. S])ace, then, is place potentially ; and when it is filled with body, then it is place actualli/. See Krauth's Fleming, Vocahulai-y of the Philosophical Sciences, s. v. ; Ueberweg, //is^ of Philosophy (see Index).
Spada, Bernardino, an Italian cardinal, was born at Brisighella, in Komagna, April 21, 1594, of an obscure family. After studying the humanities with the Jes- uits in Rome, he applied himself to ecclesiastical juris- prudence, in which he acquired considerable reputation. He was honored with several dignities by Paul V and Gregory XV, an<i afterwards by Urban YIII, who sent him on various commissions to France and Parma, and gave him the archbishopric in partihus of Damietta, the cardinalate in 1626, and the legation to Bologna in 1627. He was a patron of the fine arts, and left some Poems and Letters addressed to Mazarin. Spada died in Home, Nov. 10, 166 L
Spada, Fabrizio, nephew of Bernardino, born March 18, 1643, was made archbishop of Patras, nuncio to Savoy and France, and cardinal in 1675. He died June 15, 1717.