ognised. He only pushed the Cartesian method and the Cartesian doctrine to their furthest conscciuences. There are two leading dogmas of Des Cartes — one con- cerned with his method, the other with his doctrine. The former is that a clear idea is a true one, since the mind contains within itself the germs of truth, in the form of innate ideas. The latter is that mind and mat- ter constitute the universe, as thought and extension ; that they are entirely diverse, and cannot act upon each other. See Dks Cxuriis. These two dogmas consti- tute the starting-points of Spinozism, in procedure and in system. "To have a certain knowledge of the truth," says Spinoza, "it is sufficient to have a clear idea'' (comp. Ethics, pt. ii, prop, xliii). " Ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false." What is clear, then, is certain; what is certain, is true; and the mind is both the source and the judge of true knowl- edge. This is Cartesianism, Spinoza recognised four different kinds of knowledge, according to their origin and according to their adequacy. Intuition, the high- est grade, is alone wholly satisfactory (comp. Ethics, pt. ii, prop, xl). The influence of Platonism upon both Des Cartes and Si)hMiza is here manifest. Nothing is true which is not presented as a clear and adequate idea, A clear and adequate idea is necessarily true. The invalidity of these assumptions need not be insist- ed upon. They are the foundation of Spinoza's inethod. The object of life is to attain a knowledge of the truth — of the truth of being, of absolute truth. All oth- er aims are relatively unimportant. Everything l>ut this is merely secondary. Worldly temptations, world- ly enjoyments, wealth, power, honors, indulgences, dis- tract the mind, and inifit it for such high contempla- tions, and for their earnest prosecution. They should be renounced, in order to secure the serene tempera- ment and the unclouded vision and the unselfish devo- tion which the genuine pursuit of truth demands. Thus only can the attainment of clear, ami therefore of true, ideas be expected. But, besides the knowledge of prin- ciples, which are the data of reasoning, the knowledge of the consequences of these principles, and of the re- ciprocal relations of such consequences, must be ac- quired. First principles, or disconnected ideas, are the beginning of knowledge, not its body. All possible con- seipiences are evolved from them, but they must be traced in their relations and their interdependences. This must be done by the strictest reasoning, without suffering the interference of any obscure, vague, or im- perfect notions. Such reasoning must be distinct and conclusive in all its stages, coercive of assent, and rig- idly-demonstrative. The strictest form of demonstra- tion is geometrical, hence geometrical reasoning alone can suffice for the re(iuirements of a true exposition of true doctrine. It will be noted that Sjiinoza does not f)ursue the course of investigation, but the course of de- velopment. He always proceeds a prioi-i. His prin- ciples, whether admissible or not, are data, are assump- tions. The sufficient proof of their truth with him is their lucidity. Thence every position is reached sim- ply by deduction, Pascal, one of the greatest of math- ematicians, had luminously shown the inapplicability of mathematical reasoning to inmiathematical topics. Ihit the Cartesian dogma of clear ideas being necessa- rily true engrossed the mind of Spinoza, and determined his whole method. Cartesianism was dominant through- out Kurope. The brightest minds were occupied in (piestioning Cartesianism, in refuting objections, re- moving discords, supjilying deficiencies, and assuring its coherence and completeness. In one fundamental re- spect Cartesianism was luisatisfactory and inexjilicalile. There was a serious flaw in a cardinal doctrine which exacted redress. The iniivorse consisted of thought and extension, mind and matter. Everything fell un- der one or the other category, or was composed of hoth. Hut mind and matter were asserted to be wholly dis- tinct and inconnnunicable. Neither was capable of act- ing on the other. How were the functions of life, the
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actions of rational beings, the conduct of creatures ca- pable of spontaneous movement, to be accounted for? Here was the knot which Cartesianism could not untie, which must be untied before Cartesianism could be completely valid. The same knot, in a disguised form, is still perplexing speculation. Various solutions of the difficulty were proposed ; all have proved extravagant and inadetiuate. See Leibnitz; Maleduanciie. (Spi- noza accepted the postulates of Des Cartes, and appre- ciated the difficulty wiiich rent Cartesianism from crown to sole. If he could only obtain clear ideas of mind and matter, their relations to each other would be dis- cerned and the problem would be solved. Mind and matter constitute the universe; they are variously con- joined; they suffer concurrent moclitications ; they act continually in harmony, yet they cannot act upon each other. The only conchision consonant with these posi- tions is that mind and matter are essentially one and the same ; that they are diverse aspects of a single ex- istence, and that they are distinguished by merely ap- parent and accidental differences. If the same, they must be, and must have been, the same at all times and throughout all eternity, through all their changes and in all their forms. There is no longer any need of ex- plaining their reciprocal interaction, for there is no inter- action. There is no necessity for any divine pre-ordi- nation or divine co-operation to bring about material changes coincidently with mental determinations, be- cause, as the universe is reduced to absolute unity, the Divinity is itself embraced in that unity — igj indeed, that unity. There is inconclusiveness in the reasoning, no doubt; if there were no inconclusiveness, Spinozism would be true. It is not meant to be asserted that S|ii- noza consciously pursued the course of reasoning here presumed, or has anywhere formally developed it. The foundations of his philosophy are intuitive, according to his own principles. But from his essay on the Ref- ormution of the Understamliiif/, from the constitution of his Ethics, from the whole complexion of his scheme, from the Cartesianism which furnisher' his point of de- parture, and the correction of Cartesianism which he submitted as his system, it is certain that he must have instinctively pursued this or a like line of reasoning.