Everything is thus swallowed up in the Divinity. God is all, and all is God — not interchangeably, for that would be materialistic theism, which is practical athe- ism ; but with the precedence and exclusivencss of the divine, and that is idealistic pantheism. Things are not preordained, or predetermined, or prearranged, but preinvolved. Whatever phenomena arise, whatever changes occur, they are the transitory manifestations of some modification of the divine activity. There is mutation of accidents, there is no mutation of essence. The waves swell and roar upon the ocean, the bubbles burst upon the waves, but the ocean remains identical- ly the same —
"Such as creation's dawn behpld."
But there is no creation, there is only transfiguration through the incessant evolution and revolution of one eternal being. All possibilities are contained in this being, and all possibilities come into act, not coinci- dently or contemporaneously, but in diverse order and position. There is but one existence, one substance, hni infinite forms. "There cannot be, and we cannot conceive, any other substance than God." "Whatever is, is in God ; and nothing can be, nor can be conceived, without God" {Ethics, pt. i, prop, xiv, xv). These are foregone conclusions. They are involved in the third and sixth definitions of tlie first part. The definitions are assumptions, and arbitrary assumptions. All Spi- nozism is latent in Spinoza's definition of substance, as all possibilities and eventualities are enclosed in the Spinozistic Divinity. But Spinoza's definition of sub- stance is altogetlier alien from the definitions and con- ceptions of the (ireek and other pliilosophers. With the latter, substance is shadowy and almost inappre-
hensible, the final residuum after everything conceiva- ble lias been separated from the aggregate of accidents, properties, and other constituents. With Spinoza, it is the cause and b((dy of tliose accidents and properties, and of what else tiiere may be. In both cases, it is true, it is the foundation, the underlying <iliqnid neces- sarium — to inroKfi^ifvov. With S|)in<iza it is everv- thing, with the rest it is nothing that can be conceived. From the unity of substance and the concomitant uni- versality of the Divinity, all Spinozism follows of neces- sity, and its pantheistic character is also a necessary consequence, with or without geometrical deduction. We have exhibited only the roots of the doctrine; the trunk, the branches, the leaves, the blossoms, and the fruit all spring from them. We have not the space to pursue Spinoza through all the intricacies of his sys- tem. It is only necessary to add to the exjdanations already given that the Ethics of Spinoza include ontol- ogy, psychology, and deontology. The treatise is dis- tributed into five parts : I. On God ; II. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul; III. On the Nature and Origin of the Passions ; IV. On the Slavery of Man, or the Strength of the Passions; V. On the Power of the Un- derstanding, or the Liberty of Man. This freedom is very delusive. Man has no freedom of volition or of action. The only freedom accorded by Spinoza is free- dom from other constraint than the necessities of his nature (Ethics, pt. ii, prop, xlviii ; pt. iii, def. ii, prop, ii, etc.).
In the rigorous demonstrations of S|)inoza, though the validity of the demonstration may be sometimes contested, there are many acute and profound observa- tions. Nothing can be more surprising or more inspir- iting than his deduction and enforcement of every duty and of every virtue in the fifth part. There is a nice distinction between Natura naturans and Nutvra na- tia-utu which has become so celebrated and is often so convenient that it should not be left without notice {Ethics, pt. i, prop, xxix, Schol.). With Spinoza, Nn- tura naturans is the divine substance considered as op- erating cause; Katura natiirata the divine substance considered as effect or modification. With philosophers of dissimilar tenets, iV«^i//'« naturans signifies nature in her silent operation producing the appropriate results ; and Natura naturatu the results of such operation.
There is ample temptation for further comment and for abundant reflection, but these must be reluctantly renounced. From the brief survey of the essential char- acter of Spinozism, it will be evident that the doctrine is the purest and completest pantheism — the purest in every sense. It is pantheism, and has consequently af- finities and correspondences with all fashions of panthe- ism. It is inevitably opposed to all revealed religion, yet it is steeped through and through in the Divinity; but in an endless, formless, indiscriminate, impersonal, and mistaken Divinity. It is the reductio ad absurdum of Cartesianism. It therefore instituted no sect and invited no acolytes. The philosophy became a target and a butt, and wiien new forms of error menaced re- ligion it passed away, and has been too little remem- bered. The memory of the clear s])irit, the noble nat- ure, and the unspotted life of Spinoza should not be al- lowed to sink into oblivion.
IV. Litejiiture. — B.de Spinoza Opera (77»?iZfT, ed. Pau- las (.Jena, 1802-3); id. ed. Gfrorer (Stuttg. 1830); id. ed. Bruder (Lips. 1843-4G); Saisset, Oiurres de Spinoza (Par. 1842); Prat, (Euvres Completes de Spinoza (ibid. 1866) ; Van Vloten, Ad B.de Spinoza Opera qua Su- persunt Omnia Suppl. (Amst. 18G9); Scliaarsmidt, B. de Spinoza, Korte Verhamkling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs Wi'l.itand (il)id. 18t)'.») ; Sigwart, B. de Spinoza's Kurzer Tractat ron Gott, dem Menschen vnd dessen Gliick- seligkeit (Tiib. 1870) ; Spinoza, Tractatus Theolor/ico-po- liticus (Lond. 1877) ; Aanvi, Spinoza, Dien, l'//omme,et la Beatitude (Par. 1878) ; Ba\le, Bict. Hist. Crit. s. v. " Spi- noza ;" Dietz, Ben. ron Spinoza, nach Lehen und Lehi-en (Leips. 1783) ; Jacobi, Utber die Lehre des Spinoza (ibid.