" Now melt into sorrow, now madden to crime." No one is free from such impulses. The vice comes from vieldinj,' to them. They are checked and sujipressed when reason acts coolly and with assured judf;ment. and when disciplined habUs of thoui;ht and feeling have been tirmly establisheil. Impulses are rational or irra- tional acciirding as they are consonant with the dic- tates of nature or at variance with them. The irration- al impulses produce four classes of emotion, springing from defects of imagination and disordered fantasies. These emotions are pleasure, desire, care, fear. Such emotions are mischievous in their tendencies and in- jurious in themselves. Hence, serene feelings, ii<Tra- Btiai, were placed in opposition to ttci^i], or passions. The undisturbed How of passive and impassive senti- ment was termed tvpoia, and was indispensable to hai>- piness.
It must be manifest that the Stoic fatalism, the abso- lute and unintermittent reign of physical and moral law, the negati<in of all freedom of the will, render the pur- suit of virtue and of happiness an illusion. Thoughts, passions, actions, consequences, are all necessitated. The wise man has oidy to submit. Such inconsisten- cies and absurdities are characteristic of the Stoic doc- trine. Hut the doctrine must be received as it has been delivered; Air it is alone true in the estimation of the sect, and out of the sect there is no assurance of happiness. Moreover, man is a reasoning, yet by no means a reasonable, animal. It would be a bad thing for the world if man were intluencetl to pursue the right course by no arguments except those that are valid. The imperfections of the ^itoic creed did not prevent its exercising a very potent and a very whole- some influence upon the moralitj' of the world.
The man who upholds and practices the Stoic doc- trine, who suppresses all earnest feeling and acts in ac- cortlance with reason, with nature, and with law, is vir- tuous, wise, and happy. To him "no evil thing can come." The re<(uirements, it was recognised, transcend the measure of human capacities; for the universal de- pravity of man is a .Stoic tenet, and one which is neces- Hitated by the Stoic philosophy. In the experience of life it is necessary to divide the Stoic community, theo- retical and actual, into two classes — the jiroticient and the progressive, the saints and the seekers. In like mainu'r actions are divided into perfect, tcaTOft^oiftara, anil meet, Kii^iiKurra — a division (iroposed probably by Zeno himself ( Diog. Laert. vii, 2.5). The wise man is admitted by the Stoics to be, like the "suramus orator" of Cicero, a dream — an ideal :
"A faultless monster which the world ne'er saw."
To ihid ideal the genuine Stoic will approximate more or less closely. So far as he approaches it, he will be wise, prudent, virtuous, happy ; superior to the accidents of fortune; regardless of the advantages or calamities of life, lie may be crushed, but he will not be east <Iowm; frustrated, but not overcome; dishonored, vet without shame; tortured, yet suffering no evil; man- ({led, but wh<de in spirit; in every chance and change, «<-lf-centred, wlf-poised, serene, the same. He will al- ways prettcnt a steaily and nnconcpiered front —
"Invleta devicturn nienle C'ntoiiem" (Seneca, p(i»»{rn, v. Index ; f icero, Dr Fin. iii, 7, 20 ; Plu- tarch, Ciimpniil. I.U). I)i]iitd. etc.; Hrucker, lli.tl. Crit. l'hU.\,'Mi'.)). When troubles increase beyond remedy; when reasonnl)le hope is extinct; when life offers iio prosfx-ct of benelit tohims<ir. his c<iinitry, or hisfriemls; even whin wi-nry of existence, the Sluic holds in his own hamls the immediate means of redress and escajje.
A voluntary death, a dignified suicide, a prompt return to the all-receiving bosom of the universe, puts an end to vain struggles, to insurmountable difliculties, or to the faintness of the llesh (Cicero, De Fin. iii, 18, GO, 61).
Long as this notice has been, there has not been space to enter into the interminable details and develojiments of the Stoic doctrine. Its ai]titudc as a creed; its pre- tensions as a religion, especially in the practical aspects of theology or morality; its quaint agreement with much of the language and some of the dogmas of Chris- tianity, can scarcely be overlooked, and merit most seri- ous consideration. They have attracted the regards of many inquirers. The total diversity of a materialistic Divinity, an unspiritual humanity, and a fatalistic uni- verse separates Stoicism completely from all revealed re- ligion, and brings it, on several sides, into communion with Spinozism; on others, with the material evolution of much recent science. With all its syncretism, its verbal trickeries, its discords, and its excesses, it was certainly a very significant product of Greek specula- tion and aspiration. While renouncing human sympa- thies, it enlarged the narrow sentiment of civic national- ity into a sense of universal humanity. It made the whole world one (Cicero, De Fin. iii, 1-i, G2, 63), and con- verted friendship from an indulgence into a duty. It extended the conception of law and of moral obligation, and rendered them imperative upon societies and indi- viduals. It checked, reproved, and turned back the growing demoralization of the ancient communities; and it was, probably, an efficacious agency in preparing the pagan world for the gradual but rapid acceptance of Christianity.
IV. Lite7-ature. — It is unnecessary to refer to the clas- sic authorities and the historians of philosophy. It will suffice to specify, Lipsius, Manuductio ad Stoic. Phil, (Antw. 1604) ; Gataker, De Disciplina Stoica (Cantab. 1653); Menagii Ohss.ap,Diog. Laert. (Amst. 1692), vol. ii; Tiedemann, Syst. der stoisch. Phil. (Leips. 1776, 3 vols.) ; Ravaisson, Essai sur le Stii'icisme (Paris, 1856); id. De la Moi-ale des Stoiques ( ibid. 1857 ) ; Dournf, Du Stoicisme et du Christianisme (ibid. 1863); MouKe, Le Stoicisme a Rome (ibid. 1865); Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (Lond. 1870) ; Wegschneider, Ethices Stoicce Recent, Fund, (llamb. 1797); Scioppius, Elementa Stoic. Phil. Mo?: (iMayence, 1608); Lilii De Stoica Phil. Mor. (Altona, 1800); Meyer, Stoic. Doctr. Eth, cum Chr. Comparata (Giitting. 1823); Munding, Die. Grundsdtzeder stoisch. Mor. (Hotterd. 1846) ; Heintze, Stoic, de Affectibus Doctrina (A\'ittenb. 1861); \A. Stoi- coi'itm Ethica (Naumb. 1862) ; Hanse, Stoicorum de Fata Doctrina (Nuremb. 1859) ; Thomasius, De Stoicor, Mun- di Exustione (Leips. 1672) ; Sonntag, De Palim/enesia Stoicti (Jena, 1700); Zimmermann, Quie Ratio Phil. Sto- ic, sit cum Rcl. Rom. (Erlangen, 1858) ; Laferriere, Mem. cone. V Injluence du Stoirisme sur la Doctrine des Juris- cousultes Rom. (Paris, 1860) ; Winter, Stoicorum Panihe- isiiius (Wittenl). 1863); The Ancient Stoics, in Oxford Essays (1865); TouUotte, Hut.de la Phil, des Emp, de- puis Cesar (Paris, 1822). See Stoics. (G. F. II.)