In agreement with those views, and also with those of previous philosophers, philosophy was divided by the Stoics into three parts: Physics, Ethics, and Logic; or, by Cleanthes, into six: Logic, Hhetoric; Ethics, Poli- tics ; Physics and Theology. The latter scheme is only a binary subdivision of the original tripartite distribution. The order of the parts was variously delennined b_v dif- ferent Stoic teachers. Logic came first with some, physics with others; but logic and physics were alike constituted mainly, if not solely, for the sake of ethics, in order to determine the character an<i the duties of the virtuous man. One order or another will be pre- ferred, according to the point of view from which the whole systetn is regarded. If if is desiralile to trai'C the genesis and the organic relations of the doctrine, ethics
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should take precedence, as in the tliird book of Cicero's tractate De Fiuihus Buiiorum el Mahnim, where ethics occupy nearly the whole book, only two chapters out of the twenty-two being conceded to dialectics and plivs- ics. This order of exposition would be tedious and in- convenient on the present occasion, as the other parts of the speculation would liave to be broken up and dis- membered, in order to show their coiniection with the moral tenets. If it is proposed to establish the authori- ty and obligation of the Stoic rule on the basis of per- vading law, physics, as including the constitution of the universe, and theology should come lirst. This sequence is unftivorable to a condensed presentation of the philos- ophy, and throws logic out of connection with the otiier parts. Hence the most convenient order is to treat tirst of logic, next of physics, and lastly of ethics. The means of ascertaining and securing truth are thus tirst considered ; then the order and constitution of universal nature, by which the duties of man are determined and his actions controlled; and, tinally, the obligations im- posed upon man by the laws of reason and the laws of existence.
I. Lot/ic. — The Stoic logic consisted of three divi- sions : Rhetoric, or continuous exposition ; Dialectics, or discontinuous speech, specially argumentation, "inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa" (Seneca, Epist. xiv, 1, 17); and, thirdly, the Criterion, or test of truth. The Criterion was not one of the original divisions.
1. Our information in regard to the Stoic rhetoric is limited, broken, and unsatisfactory. Ehetoric, in the Stoic plan, included topics which would now be consid- ered foreign to the art, and wotdd be relegated to gram- mar. It excluded others which would seem to be es- sential members of this branch of discipline. To this head, apparently, belonged the fantastic etymologies which were so diligently and erroneously cultivated by the school.
2. Dialectics embraced expression and the means of expression — thoughts and words. It therefore appro- priated much which sliouki be conceded to rhetoric; it gave great attention to the nature and contents of sen- tences, and thus advanced grammatical inquiry and grammatical precision. So far as reasoning was con- cerned, it borrowed the logic of Aristotle and amplified it, without adding anything to it of substantial value. Like Sir William Hamilton, it introduced needless refine- ments and interminable subtleties. The Stoics gave their approval exclusively to the hypothetical syllo- gism; habitually practiced ratiocination by captious questions and evasive answers; elaborated the doctrine of fallacies, and were frecjuently entangled in their own toils; invented manifold and bewildering distinctions, according to the fashion of the schoolmen ; and, like them, exercised themselves in continual disputation. Hence they were reproached with wire-drawn and bri- erv argumentation: "subtile vel spinosum potius disse- rendi genus" (Cicero, De Fin. iii, 1,8). They thus mer- ited the denunciation and the ridicule both of enemies and friends.
3. The Stoic doctrine on the Criterion is a notable part of the general theory, and is closely associated with the whole system. It is the basis on which the tlieory rests, and by which its validity is upheld. It cannot be examined here in its develoiiment and details. The Stoic philosophers wore harassed, as other philosophers have been, with the fundamental necessity of establish- ing some ground of assurance for truth — a irov (jriu for reason to work on. They approximated to Locke in regarding all knowledge as deducible from i)ercei)tions and conceptions, which are analogous to, but not identi- cal with, the sensation and reflection of the Enghsh phi- losopher. They agreed with Des Cartes in mistaking positiveness of conviction for certitude of truth. They attached much weight to common notions — Koival «'- poiai — which are not innate ideas, but impressions and judgments in which all men intuitixfly agree. The reception of impressions and the formation of concep-
tions were purely material and mechanical processe.s. The former were at first represented as produced liy the actual im]>osition of a stamp, or die, upon tlie sensorium. Clirysippus recognised that this view was untenable, as eacli successive impression would thus t)hir or blot out its precursors, and memory would be rendered inconceiv- able. He substituted tlie rational alteration of the per- cipient substance for mere press-work — fiXXniwffif for riiTrwfTif — with less lucidity than Herbert Spencer anil other cerebrologists have done. No reality was attach- ed to thought as an intellectual force, nor to thought as an intellectual prochiet ; it was but the shadow, or pho- tograph, or physical residt of the phenomena of nature. The Stoics were Nominalists after the order of the Cyn- ics; being here, as in so many other respect.s, y)«?7)e Ct/- iiici (Cicero, De Off. iii, ><). A perception was simply a fantasy, an appearance, a mental alteration. But a fantasy was distinguished from a phantasm, or appari- tion, which was a mental delusion, A true perception was apprehended by the apprehension of the apprehen- sive faculty — (pavTuaia icar«X»;7rriic('y : '"opium facit dormire, quia virtus est dormitiva." This position is a partial or qualified anticipation of Des Cartes. The in- validity and the falliljility of the (caraXj/Trrmv) (Jtoi'Taaia are pleasantly illustrated by an anecdote told of Sphjp- rus at the court of I'tolemy, in Alexandria (Athena'us, Ihipn. viii, 4). A joke, it is true, is not an argument. It ftillowed from the doctrine of perception that common notions and assured convictions were necessjirily true: "All that exists takes value from opinion." JMuch of the ethical paradox of the Stoics proceeds from this false point of departure. It was a \cr\ rude and unsafe cri- terion of knowledge, and sanctioned the acceiitance of whatever might be confidently believed and audacious- ly asserted. A justification of it from the Stoic jjoint of view may be found in the Stoic physics. If the in- dividual reason is oidy an etHucnce from the universal reason ; if all things, and therefore all impressions, arc necessarily determined by unerring law, the fantasy which is obscured by no doubt or indistinctness must be in accord with the universal reason, and must, conse- quently, be true. This is Spinozism, or strangely re- sembles it. To aid in the analysis of ])erceptions and thought, the Stoics ileviscd a system of Categories, di- verse in principle as in designation from the Categories of Aristotle, but consonant with their physics and meta- physics, which were, indeed, the same. Their highest conception was Being, for which was afterwards sid>sti- tuted Something or Anythin;/. Under this, in regular gradation, were arranged — 1. Substance ; 2. Property ; 3. Variety ; 4. Variety of Relation. The deviation from Aristotle proceeiled fVom the necessities of the Stoic physics, which, like S|)inoza, recognised oidy one sub- stance, only one real being or entity; but, unlike Spi- noza, made that one substance matter. We are thus in- troduced to the Stoic physics.