III. Ethics.— From' the nature of man and tlie nature of evil, the transition is immediate to the domain of morals, which is occupied with the proprieties (rd ko- iijKovTCi) of human conduct. This part of the doctrine constitutes the essence of the Stoic scheme. It was prosecuted by the sect, in tlieory and practice, with even greater earnestness than by their Cyreuaic prede- cessors, of whom it was said :
Tt/i' 5' uperrji' irapa yfuififia SiwKovret KaTtTf)(/3ov.
For this branch all the rest of the elaborate Stoic sys- tem was devised. Nevertheless, it was treated with much diversity by different leaders of the school. Tlie divisions of the subject were inimerous and varying, ol'ten painfully minute, and frc(iuently irreconcilable with each other. There was looseness of distribution, as elsewhere in the Stoic system, and needless refine- ment in the intricate distinctions and subdivisions. We are expressly told, as might easily have been con- jectured, that the subject was more simply trcatecl by Zeno than bv Chrysippus and the followers and imi- tators of Chrysippus. Tlie leading topics, and these
alone can claim our attention here, are essentially the same. They are the "suramum bonum," or highest good; the ultimate aim of life {JiiitK); the regulation of the passions; aiul the ordering of life. The highest gotxl, with whicli the ultimate aim of life connects it- self, is true happiness and its prosecution. Herillus made this scope or end knowledge, deviating in this re- gard from the general o|)inion of his sect (^Cieero, Ue Flu. v, 2.')). Happiness can be attained solely by con- formity to the order of nature, and recjuires willing obe- dience to the operations of universal law. Obedience is inevitable; but the wise ami good man yields it with full consent; the fool and tlie knave vainly resist it ("Melius est ire quam ferri"). Law is equivalent to good, and good to law. The good, the useful, and the proper are strictly identical. All things are good that tend to the attainment of the supreme good; all things are evil that oppose or obstruct its attainment. There are only two contrasts, "boiuira et turpe;" all good things are equally good. Tliere is no distinction of tilings evil; all are ecpially bad. " He who violates one tittle of the law violates the wluile law." Tlie only opposition is be- tween the good and the bad. But this unyielding uni- formity, this hard antagonism, could not be maintained in the practical experiences of life. A system of accom- modations was demanded. An intermediate term was ac- cordingly introduced. A large class of accidents and ac- tions— health, wealth, strength, honor, station, influence, etc. — was ranged under the wide head of things indiffer- ent (aSidipopa}. This relaxation appears to have been introduced by Zeno's immediate pupil, Aristo of Chios. Things indiffereirt might become either good or evil, according to the use which might be made of them, or the service which thej' might be ajit at any time to render. Whenever they were instrumentalities for the attainment of the " summimi bonum," they were good ; when the}' prevented or impeded its attainment, they were bad. When they did neither, they remained col- orless and neutral. ^ There were many distinctions, sub- distinctions, and quasi-distinctions in regard to iiulif- ferences which must be passed over. There was mani- fold, but iKit very important, diversity of opinion in re- gard to things indifferent. Ingenious efforts were con- tinually made to
"divide A hair 'twixt south and sonth-west side."
The Stoic subtlety and cavillation, the Stoic legerde- main with words and principles, and the intiiiitesimal diversijicaiimis of the sect were nowhere more conspic- uous than in the deiiartment of ethics. The Stoic school furnishes a singular anticipation of theological casuistry. Its acute but misapplied distinctions and contradistinctions find a counterpart in the controver- sies between the Franciscans and the Fratricelli about the interpretation of the ISIendicant vow ot alisolute poverty. Happiness, the great aim of life, can be hope- fully pursued only by the constant observance of the laws of nature : "convenienter natune vivere" (Cicero, I)e Fin. iii, 7, '20). This is virtue, conformity to law — the law of human nature and the law of the universe. It is also the law of (iod, who is himself under the law. It is from this conception of the universality and universal oliiigation of law that is derived tlie Stoic idea of a "state of nature" and of the natural eqiial- it}' of all men. Tiie latter dogma was, indeed, jiressed upon the acceptance of Zeno and of the later Stoics by tiie cosmopolitan tendencies of the times, and by the predominant estimation and consideration of tlie moral character of men. It was pressed to an extreme which was singularly at variance with the prejudices of an- tiquity. The language of I'aul on the subject of the claims of slaves is scarcely as strong as that of Seneca : "•Servi sunt.' Immo homines. 'Servisunt.' Immo contaheriialcs. ' Servi sunt.' Immo humiles aniici. 'Servi sunt.' Immo coiiservi; si cogitaveris tantum- dem in utrosque licere fortunx'" {Ejmf. v, 47, I, et vide §10,11,15>
STOIC PHILOSOPHY
1036
STOICISM
The acconlaiicc with law, the ohstrvance of those | pn)prictios whuli arc consonant with nature, cannot be i ex|>octcil without complete exemption from all pertur- bations and without liabitual self-restraint. We are misleil hv inconsiilerate aiul unrepilated impulses which generate passions that blind us to our duties, and