anything. Our first, idea of substance is probably de- rived from the consciousnessof self— the conviction that, while our sensations, thoughts, and purposes are chang- ing, we continue the same. We see bodies, also, remain- ing the same as to ipiantity or extension, while their col- or and tigiirc, ilieir state of motion or of rest, may be change<i. Substances are cUhaT primaii/. that is, sin- gular, indiviilual substances; or secumlary, thut is, gen- era and species of substance. Substances have also been divided into complete and incomplete, finite and infinite. 15ut these are rather divisions of behifi. Substance may, however, be properly divided into matter and spirit, or that wliicli is exten.lcd and that which tliinks. Sub- stance is given by Aristotle as one of the four principles common to all spheres of reality ; the other three being form or essence, moving or elficient cause, and end. He says, further, that the individual alone has substantial existence, and detines oi'aia, in tlie sense of the individ- ual sidjstance. as that which cainiot be predicated of anytliing else, but of which anything else may be pred- icated. .Johannes I'liiloponus of Alexandria, by ex- tending the Aristotelian doctrine, that substantial exist- ence is to be jjredicated in the fullest sense only of in- dividuals, to the dogma of the Trinity, thereby in- curred the accusation of tritheisra. John Scotus re- garded the Deity as the substance of all things, and could not, therefore, regard individual, concrete things as substances, of which the general may be predicated and in wliicli the accidental- is contained. He views all things, rather, as contained in the divine substance. Berengarius of Tours (Be Saa-a Cana) disputes the theory of a change of substance, claimed by the advo- cates of transubstantiation, without a corresponding change in the accidents, i. e. a change in the bread and wine apparent to the senses. lioscellinus teaches that whatever is a substance is, as such, not a j)art; and the juirt is, as such, not a substance, but the result of that subjective separation of the substance into parts which we make in [thought and in] discourse. Gilbert us thus speaks: The intellect collects the universal, which ex- ists, but not as a substance {est, sed non substat), from the particular things wdiich not merely are (sunt), but also (as subjects of accidents) have substantial exist- ence, by considering only their substantial similarity or conformity. Descartes deAwes substance as follows: "By substance we can only understand that which so exists that it needs nothing else in order to its exist- ence;" and adds that, " indeed, only one substance can be conceived as jjlainly needing nothing else in order to its existence, namely, (iod; for we plainly perceive that all others cainiot exist without (iod's assistance." Spinoza understands substance to be "that which is in itself, and is to be conceived by itself. There is only one substance, and that is (Jod. This substance has two fundamental (pialities or attributes cognizable by us, namely, thought and extension ; there is no extend- ed substance as distinct from thinking sulistance." "There are not two sul)stances equal to each other, since such substances would limit each other. One substance cainiot produce or be produced bj' another substance. Every substance which is in God's infinite understanding is also really in nature. In nature there are not different substances; nature is one in essence, and identical with (Jod." Locke says, "Tbc mind, be- ing furnished with a great number of simple ideas, con- veyed to it by sensation and refieclion, remarks that a certain number of them always go together; and since we cannot imagine that which is rejiresented by them as subsisting by itself, we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum in which it subsists, and from which it arises; this substratum wo call a substance. The idea of substance contains nothing but the supposition of an unknown something serving as a support for qualities." Leibnitz gives the name monad to simple, unextended substance; that is, a substance which has the power of action; active force (like tlie force of the strained bow) is the essence of substance. He held that the divisibil-
SUBSTANCE I
ity of matter proved that it was an aggregate of sub- stances; there can be no smallest indivisible bodies or atoms, because these must still be extended, and would therefore be aggregates of substances; that the real sub- stances of which bodies consist are indivisible, cannot be generated, and are indestructible, and in a certain sense similar to souls, which he likewise consiilers as in- dividual substances.- The individual, unextended sub- stances were termed by Leibnitz monads. Hume re- marks, " We have no clear ideas of anything but per- ceptions; a substance is something quite diiferent from perceptions; hence we have no knowledge of a sub- stance. The question whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance cannot be answered, because it has no intelligible sense." John Stuart Mill distinguishes substances as bodily and mental, and says, '• Of the first, all we know is, the sensations which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of these sensa- tions; i.e. the hidden cause of our sensations. Of the second, that it is the unknown recipient of them." See Fleming, Vocab. of Pliilosoph. Sciences, s. v. ; Ueberweg, History of Philosophy (see Index).
SUBSTANCE, a term used in technical divinity to describe nearly the same idea as essence or nature. Thus the Son is said to be the same substance with the Father, that is, truly and essentially God, as the Fa- ther is. See Chkistology.