Theiuer, Johann Anton, brother of Augustin, was born at Breslau. Dec. 15, 1799. He studied tlieol- og}', was made chaplain in 1823 in Zobten on the Bo- ber, and in 1824 was appointed professor of exegesis and canon law at Breslau. The lively interest which he took in the reformatory movements of his Chin'ch obliged him to give up liis lectures, and he entered upon ministerial duties at different places. In 1845 he sided with the German Catholic movement, from which he soon withdrew, in 1848, and lived excommunicated by his Church until 1855, when he was made custos of the university library at Breslau, where he died. May 15, 1860. He wrote, Descriptio Codicis qui Versi<mem Pen- tateuchi Arahieani continet (Berlin, 1822): — fJie zwolf kleinen Propheten (Leips. 1828) : — Dasjunfte Buch Mo- sis (ibid. 1831): — De Pseudoisidoriana. Canonum Collec- tione ( Breslau, 1837 ) : — Die reformat orischen Bestre- hungender kathol. Kirche (Altenburg, 1845): — Das Se- ligkeitsdogma in der kathol. Kirche (ibid. 1847): — Ent- hiillungen iiher Lehren u. Leben der kathol. Geistlichkeit. See Winer, llandbnch der theolog. Literatur, i, 174, 603; ii, 22, 800; Theologisches Universal-Lex. s. v.; Regens- hurger Real-Encyklop. s. v.; Zuchold, Bibl. Theol. ii, 1322 ; Fiirst, Bibl. Jud. iii, 419. (B. P.)
Theism. The etymological opposite of theism can only l)e atheism, since the word designates a conception of the universe according to which a Deity rides over nature and men, and the atheistic view denies the ex- istence of the Deity and divine powers. Various spe- cific contrasts are, however, contained under this gen- eral meaning of the term, as monotheism and polythe- ism, or deism and pantheism.
The dispute between monotheism and polytheism is no longer open. Philosophy and theology have long been agreed that the Deity can be but one, and that the idea of a multiplicity of gods involves a contradictio in adjecto. There can be but one supreme, perfect, abso- lute Being, and such a Being is required even if the
superior orders generally of supernatural beings be in- cluded under the idea of tlie Deity. Tliis doctrine has, moreover, the supjiort of human experience, since his- tory shows that in every instance where a thorough de- velopment of polytheism has been reached, it eventu- ates in monotheism to the extent of subordinating the many gods to one who is supreme, or of regarding them as simple modes of conceiving of his nature, powers, or manifestations. It may be added that the converse idea, on which the origin of iiolyiheism is foinid in pan- theistic identilications of the Deity with nature and its forces, affords the most satisfactory explanation possible of the begimiings and growth of this error.
The monotheistic conception once received, however, opens the way to discussions respecting the nature of the Deity and of his relations to the universe, and com- pels recognition of the issue between deism and panthe- ism. For the conce[)tions which underlie the terms, we refer to the articles Pantheism and Deism, and in this place note merely that the term deism designates that conception of the world on which God is not only dif- ferent, but also distinct, from the universe, and which therefore denies the immanence of God in the world tmder any form, and constitutes the direct contradiction to pantheism. It is evident that this deism harmonizes with Christianity as little as does pantheism itself. It is to be noted, however, that the Scriptures return no direct and positive answer to the question. How is the relation of God to the universe to be conceived ? and speculation is accordingly compelled to attempt the so- lution of the problem after its own fashion. Theology has attempted the solution— with what degree of suc- cess it does not belong to this article to determine, since theism is not a theological, but a philosophical, term.
The modern literature of philosophy apprehends the idea of theism in a more limited meaning than that in- dicated above, and understands by the term that ten- dency and those systems which attempt to mediate be- tween pantheism and deism, and seek to solve the the- ological problem in (piestion by the method of free phil- osophical iiKpiiry. Such endeavors grew directlv out of the development of the modern philosophy of Ger- many, beginning with Kant and passing tlirongli Ficlite, Schelling, Hegel. Herl)art, etc., until deism and ]ianthe- ism came to be direct contradictories within the domain of philosophy itself. A removal of the difficulty w-as evidently demanded by the state of philosophy ; bv the ' considerations that pantheism inevitably leads to athe- ism or anthropotheism by including the world of nature and mankind in the essence of the Deity, and that it contradicts the indestructible and undeniable facts of himian consciousness; while deism renders an infinite and absolute Being impossible by its denial of any sub- stantial bond which coiniects God and the world, and its consequent assertion of the liriWtation of the Deity.
The object of theistic speculation, it may be assumed, was correctly stated by the younger Fichte in his essay Ueber den Unterschied zwischen ethischem und natura- listischem Theisnius, in the Zeitschr. fur Philosophie v. philosopische Kritik (Halle, 1856), j). 229, in these words: " Theism denotes for us the altogether general idea that the absolute world-principle, whatever differences of opinion respecting the limits within which it may be objectively apprehended may obtain, can yet in no case be conceived of as blind and unconscious power mider the category either of a universal substance or of an abstract impersonal reason, and must be apprehended as a being having existence in and for itself, to whose fun- damental attribute human thought can find no other analogy and form of expression than that of absolute self-coiisciousness. Coiniected with this conception of the Absolute Spirit, and necessarily leading up to it, is the equally general idea that tlie universal fact of the interconnection of the world indicates a beginning in accident and blind chance no more than it affords rooiii for the thought of an absolute necessity which could not be otherwise. The oidy appropriate thought, in