Theodicy ( viiulicntion of the dirine government, from Beof, God, and ciKt], Justice). This word <lates back, in the sense in which it is now currently employ- ed, no fiirther than the celebrated essay b}' Leibidtz,
whose first edition appeared at Amsterdam in 1710. It designates the attempt to justify God with reference to the imperfections, the evil, and especially the sin, which exist in the world, or, in other words, any attempt to show that God ap|)ears in the creation and government of the world as the highest wisdom and goodness, de- spite sin, evil, and ajiparent imperfections.
Leibnitz preceded such evidence with a Discours de la Conformite de la Foi avec la Raison, because a the- odicy must evidently proceed on the assumption that reason and revelation do not contradict each other, and that the former has the ability to recognise the facts presented by the latter, whether in nature or in history. As the aim of theodicy is to refute by reason the objec- tions of superficial reasoners against the wisdom and goodness of God, the work necessarily demands agree- ment between faith and reason. It is consequently the primary object of Leibnitz to show that such agreement exists, or that it must be (iresumed to exist so soon as a correct view of the idea and nature of reason is enter- tained. Keason is the " rightful combination" of truths which we recognise, either directlv or by means of rev- elation, and there can be no confiict between it and the truth which God reveals. There are two classes of truths, and, so to speak, two forms of reason. In a nar- row meaning of the word, reason has to do only with such truths as it derives from itself or recognises with- out assistance from without; and in this character it contrasts with experience, and also with faith in so far as the latter is based on authority and forms a sort of empirical certainty. Its truths are "eternal and neces- sary truths," in no wise dependent on sense-]ierceplion, and, a priori, such as reason alone can apprehend and formulate, because they are founded on logical, meta- physical, or geometrical necessity. Anotlier class of truths presents to view definite facts, e.g. the laws of nature (verites defait), such as come immediately with- in the province of experience and faith. This class of truths likewise involves necessity, and is so far set forth within the domain of reason also; but this necessity is jihysical, instead of logical or metaphysical. The con- trary to such truths is not logically impossible and un- thinkable, but cannot be because its existence would be an imperfection, a fault. This physical necessity is thus shown to be at the bottom a moral necessity, founded in the attributes of God as the highest wisdom and goodness; and as moral necessity it appertains also to the doctrines of the laith. being ascertainable by reason, and forming ground on which to comprehend and ac- cept such doctrines.
With respect to the creation of the world. Leibnitz teaches that it was i he free act of God, performed that he " might most effectually, and in a manner most wor- thy of his wisdom and goodness, reveal and impart his perfection." He coidd create only a relative perfection, however; the creation of absolutely perfect beings, i. e, gods, vvas not possible, and the world and its inhabitants were accordingly created relatively imperfect. This condition of things may be denominated metaphysical eril, whose existence was directly conditioned in the will of God by which was determined the creation of limited and imperfect beings. Physical evil, or suffer- ing, and moral evil, or sin, on the other hand, are not directly willed liy (iod, but only indirectly, as serving to promote the good and secure the attainment ofa higher perfection of the " whole," though themselves evil as re- spects the individual. The ground of metaphysical evil was, therefore, the good which God willed to secure in the creation of limited beings^ while that of physical and moral evil is '• the better" which could only thus be secured.
To the objection that God might have created a world in which jihysical and moral should have no place, or that he might have altogether refrained from the work of creating, Leibnitz replies that physical evil may serve to help the world to achieve a higher degree of good; and that moral evil, which is possible because
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God has ciulowod man with powers of volition, is like- wise so wonderl'iilly controlled as to increase the beauty of his universe as a whole. To the further objection that God thus becomes the author of sin, he replies that sin has no positive cause in so far as it is actualized in consequence of the imiierfections of the creature, but oulv a caiisd dejicifiix, which, moreover, does not work siu directly and of its own motion, but only ywr acci- dent by reason of the existence of a hii;her good than sense can recognise or desire. Tlie linal objection, that as (Jod foreknew all that is future, and consequently inaugurated a causal connection which must inevita- blv lead to whatever may come to pass, including sin, the latter is unavoidable and its punishment unjust, is met by Leil)uitz by forinidating a distinction be- tween predestination and necessity. No volitional act iicoil be performed by man unless he will. Foreor- (linatiou is not compulsion; and the intervention of foreordained events serves only to influence the will with motives, and not at all to constrain the will with force.