So that the ascribing the relations of things to the will of God, brings no uncertainty to those duties of life, which flow from such relations, but leaves the state of nature with all its relations, and the duties which flow from them, in the greatest certainty, so long as nature itself is continued; and when that either _ceases entirely_, or is only _altered_, it is not to be wondered at, if all its relations cease, or are altered with it.
Our author says, _Dare any one say, that God’s laws are not founded on the eternal reason of things?_¹
¹ Page 425.
* I dare say it with the same assurance, as that his _existence_ is not founded on the _eternal existence_ of things. And that it is the same extravagance to say, that God’s laws are founded on the _eternal reasons_ of things, as to say, that his _power_ is founded on the _eternal capacities_ of things. For the _capacities_ of things have just the same _solidity_ and _eternity_, as the relations of things have, and are just such _independent realities_ as they are: and are just the same _proper materials_ to found the omnipotence of God upon, as the relations of things are, to found his infinite wisdom upon.
And as we can say, that the _omnipotence_ of God in preserving and supporting the creation, will certainly act _suitably_ to itself, and _consistent_ with that omnipotence which first made things be what they are, and put nature into such a state as it is in; so we can say, that the _infinite wisdom_ of God in giving laws to the world, will act _suitably_ to itself, and _consistent_ with that wisdom which at first made the nature and relations of the rational world be what they are.
But then as the _omnipotence_ of God, though it acts suitably to the state of the creation, and the nature of causes and effects, which it first ordained, yet cannot be said to be founded upon the nature of causes and effects, because neither causes nor effects have _any nature_, but what they _owe_ to omnipotence; so the infinite wisdom of God, though in giving laws to the world, it acts _suitably_ to the natures and relations of rational beings, yet cannot be said to be _founded_ upon such relations, because such relations are the _effects_ of the divine wisdom, and owe their existence to it.
And the _reason_ or _relations_ of things shew God’s _antecedent_ wisdom, and are effects of it, just as the nature of _causes_ and _effects_ shew his _antecedent_ power, and are the effects of it. And as he is infinitely powerful, but not from the nature of causes and effects; so he is infinitely wise, but not from the _reason_ and _nature_ of things.
Again; if God is _infinite_ wisdom, then his wisdom cannot be founded on the relations of things, unless things _finite_, and relations that began to be, can be the foundation of that wisdom which is infinite, and could not begin to be.
Therefore to ask, _what_ it is founded upon, when it can have no foundation upon _any thing_, is asking, what an _independent_ being is dependent upon, or _how_ that began, which could have no beginning?
And to ask the reason or foundation of _any one_ of the divine attributes, is the same as asking the reason or foundation of them all. And to seek for the reason or foundation of all the divine attributes, is seeking for the cause of God’s existence.
And as we do not come to God’s existence, till we come to the _end_ of _causes_, so nothing that is divine, can be attributed to any cause.
Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, there is something whose nature is without any cause or foundation of its existence, than to say, something exists without ever _beginning_ to exist. For as nothing can have a beginning, but as it proceeds from some cause; so that which can have no beginning, can have no cause. If therefore the divine wisdom ever _began_ to be _infinite_, and we could know when that beginning was, we should have some pretence to search for that, upon which its infinity was _founded_; but if it never could begin to be, then to seek for its reason, or foundation, is seeking for its beginning.
This writer affirms, that God’s wisdom and goodness must be founded on the nature and reason of things, otherwise it could not be proved, that God was not an _arbitrary being_.
* Now to seek for reasons to prove that God is not an arbitrary being, that is, a being of the _highest freedom_ and _independency_, that does every thing according to his _own will_ and _pleasure_, is as vain, as to seek for reasons to prove, that _all things_ are not the effect of his _will_. For if every thing besides God, received its existence from him; if every thing that exists, is the effect of his will, and he can do nothing, but because he wills the doing it, must he not be free and arbitrary in as _high a manner_, as he is powerful?
This _writer_ says, _It is not in our power to love the deity, whilst we consider him to be an arbitrary being, acting out of humour and caprice._¹
¹ Page 31.