But if God’s _will_ is as _essentially_ opposite to _humour_ and _caprice_, as his _omnipotence_ is to _weakness and inability_; then it is as absurd to suppose, that God must act according to humour and caprice, because he acts according to his own will, as to suppose that he must act with inability, because he acts by his omnipotence.
And if the will of God, _as such_, is in the highest state of perfection, then we have the _highest reason_ to love and adore God, because he is arbitrary, and acts according to his _own all-perfect will_. And if it be asked, what it is that makes the will of God _all-perfect_, it may as well be asked, what it is that makes him omnipotent, or makes him to exist. For, as we have not found out a God, till we have found a being that has no _cause_; so we have not found the _will_ of God, till we have found a _will_, that has no _mover_, or _director_, or _cause_ of its perfection. For that _will_ which never began to be, can no more be any thing, but what it is in itself, than it can begin to be.
That which makes people imagine, that _will alone_ is not so adorable, is because they consider it as a blind imperfect faculty that wants to be directed. But what has such a will as this to do with the _will_ of God?
For if the will of God is as _perfect_ a _will_, as his omniscience is a _perfect knowledge_, then we are as sure, that the will of God cannot want any direction, or _will_ any thing amiss, as we are, that his omniscience cannot need any information, or fall into any mistake. And if the _will_ of God wanted any direction or government, it is impossible it should have it; for having no superior, it could only be so governed, because it _willed_ it, and therefore must be always under its own government.
All the perfection therefore that can be ascribed to God, must be ascribed to his _will_, not as if it was the production of his will, (for nothing in God is produced) but as eternally inherent in it.
And as God’s will has thus all the perfection of the divine nature, and has no rule, or reason, or motive to any goodness, that comes from it, but its own _nature_ and _state_ in God: so this great will is the only law of all creatures, and they are all to obey and conform to it, for this reason, because it is the will of God.
* Nothing has a _moral_ reason, or fitness to be done, but because it is the will of God that it should be done.
* It may be asked, Is there then no _reason_ or _nature_ of things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, considered _independently_ of the divine will, have no more _obligation_ in them, than a _divine worship_ considered independently of, and without any regard to the _existence_ of God. For the _will_ of God is as absolutely necessary to found all _moral obligation_ upon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. And the fitness of moral obligations, without the _will_ of God, is only like the fitness of _religious_ worship without the _existence_ of God.
And it is as just to say, that he destroys the _reason_ of religion, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be the will of God.
It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is in _itself absolutely_ unfit to be done?
This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes actions to be fit _in themselves_, than it makes _things_ to exist _in, or of themselves_. No things, nor any actions have any _absolute_ fitness, of and in _themselves_.
A _gift_, a _blow_, the making a _wound_, or _shedding_ of _blood_, considered in themselves, have no _absolute_ fitness, but are fit or unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances.
When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit in _itself_, which is just in the _same state_ considered in _itself_, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the will of God.
For instance, the _bare eating_ a fruit, considered in _itself_, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat our own damnation.
But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered in _itself fit_ or _unfit_: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God.