Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which according to his present circumstances, _without_ that command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which is _absolutely_ unfit in _itself_, fit to be done: but only adds _new circumstances_ to an action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral in _itself_, but because of its circumstances.
Again, it is objected, _If there is nothing right or wrong, good or bad, antecedently and independently of the will of God, there can then be no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another._
It is answered, _first_, That all goodness, and all possible perfection, is as _eternal_ as God, and as essential to him as his existence. And to say, that they are either _antecedent_ or _consequent_, _dependent_ or _independent_ of his will, would be equally absurd. To ask therefore, whether there is not something right and wrong, antecedent to the will of God, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his existence. And to ask, how God can be good if there is not something good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be not something infinite independently of him. And to seek for any other _source_ or _reason_ of the divine goodness, besides the divine nature, is like seeking for some external cause and help of the divine omnipotence.
The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neither _antecedent_, nor _consequent_ to his will.
_Secondly_, Nothing is more certain, than that all _moral obligations_ and _duties_ of creatures towards one another, _began_ with the existence of moral creatures. This is as certain, as that all corporeal qualities and effects, _began_ with the existence of bodies.
As therefore nothing has the nature of a cause or effect, nothing has any quality of any kind in bodies, but what is entirely owing to matter so created and constituted by the _will_ of God; so no actions have any _moral qualities_, but what are wholly owing to that state and nature in which they are created by the will of God.
* Moral obligations therefore of creatures have the same _origin_, and the _same reason_, that natural qualities and effects have in the corporeal world, _viz._ the sole will of God. And as in a different state of matter, bodies would have had different qualities and effects; so in a different state of rational beings, there would be different moral obligations, and nothing could be right or good in their behaviour, but what began then to be right and good, because they then began to exist in such a state and condition of life. And as their state and condition could have no other cause or reason of its existence, but the sole will of God, so the cause and reason of right and wrong in such a state, must be equally owing to the will of God.
The pretended _absolute independent fitnesses_, or _unfitnesses_ of actions therefore _in themselves_, are vain _abstractions_, and philosophical _jargon_, serving no ends of morality, but only helping people to wrangle and dispute away that sincere obedience to God, which is their only happiness. But to make these imaginary _absolute fitnesses_ the _common law_ both of God and man, is still more extravagant. For if the _circumstances_ of actions give them their _moral nature_, surely God must first be in our circumstances, before that which is a law to us, can be the same law to him.
And if a father may require that of a son, which his son, because of his _different state_, cannot require of his brother; surely that which God may require of us, may be as different from that which a father may require of a son, as God is different from a father.
Again, if God is as much under a law as we are, then he is as much under authority; for law can no more be without authority, than without a law-giver. And if God and we are under the _same law_, we must be under the _same authority_.
* But as God cannot be under any law in common with us his creatures, any more than he can be of the same rank or order with any ♦of us; so neither can he be under any law at all, any more than he can be under any authority at all.
♦ word omitted in text “of”
And though God is not to be looked upon as an _arbitrary being_, in the sense of this author, who will not distinguish arbitrary from _humour_ and _caprice_; yet in a true sense of the word, when applied to God, he must be affirmed to be an arbitrary being, that acts only from himself, from his _own will_, and according to his _own pleasure_.