The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation depends, _why_ or _when_, of _what matter_, in _what manner_, and to whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be as unsearchable by us, as the reasons of _this_ or _that_ creation of rational beings, at such a _time_, of such a _kind_, in such a _manner_, in such a _state_.
This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions, which this writer puts in this manner.
“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer the doing it till the time of _Tiberius_; since the sooner this was done, the greater would his goodness appear?”¹
¹ Page 393.
And again “How is it consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, when all had equal need of it? Was it not as easy for him to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in one?”¹
¹ Page 196.
Now all this is fully answered, by our author’s own great and fundamental principle.
“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹ as he expressly affirms; then the _sole rule_ or reason of God’s revealing any thing to any men, at any time, must have its _fitness resulting_ from the divine fore-knowledge of the effects of _such_ a revelation, at _such_ a time, and to _such_ persons. If God does not act thus, he does not act according to the relation betwixt a _fore-knowing Creator_, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to a _fitness resulting_ from this _relation_, and makes, or does not make revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good, can make a revelation at any time, and not make the _same_ at _all_ times, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can reveal that at one time, because it is a _proper_ time for it, and not reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it.
¹ Page 28.
* God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of the _fitness_ of times, and of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents, deferred a certain revelation to the time of _Tiberius_, because he _fore-saw_ it would then be an act of the _greatest_ goodness, and have its _best effects_ upon the world: to ask therefore, _what reason can be assigned_, why so good a revelation was not _sooner_, or even from the _beginning_ made to the world, is asking, why God should act, according to his _own fore-knowledge_ of the _state_ and _actions_ of _free agents_, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from such a fore-knowledge?
These questions suppose, that if God shewed his _goodness_ to mankind by a revelation at such time, he must be _wanting_ in goodness before that time, because he did not make it _sooner_; whereas if his deferring it till _such_ a time, was owing to his _fore-knowledge_ of the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have its _best effects_, then God is proved to be equally good before he made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before its _proper_ time: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had not _deferred_ it till that time.
Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions of _free agents_, as the cause of all that is particular in the _time_ and _manner_ of any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence, cannot be said to be _begging the question_, but is resolving it directly according to the _rule_, which this writer lays down for God to act by: that “the relations between things and persons, _and_ the fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”
But if this is the _sole rule_, then God in giving any revelation, must act as the _relation_ betwixt a _fore-knowing_ Creator and his _free_ creatures requires; and his actions must have their _fitness resulting_ from his fore-knowledge of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents. And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask why _this_ or _that_ revelation _only_ at _such_ a time, is to ask why God _only_ does that which is _fit_ for him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it is _not fit_ for him to do?