lute. If He purposes that a man shall reap, He purposes that he shall sow ; if He purposes that he shall be saved, He purposes that lie shall believe. Antl-Augustinians, on the other hand, regard the piu'poseg of God as conditional. He purposes the salvation of a man, if he believes. But whether he believes or not, is left uiidetermined : so^that the purpose of God is suspended on a con- dition not under his control, o'r, at least, undecided. A father may purpose to give an estate to his son, if he be obedient ; but whether the son will fulfil the condition is undetermined, and therefore the purpose of the father is undecided. It is, however, manifestly- inconsistent with the perfection of God, that He should first will one thing and then another ; nor can his purposes be dependent on the uncertainty of human conduct or events. These are ques- tions, however, which belong to the consideration of the doctrine of decrees. They are mentioned here because these distinctions occur in all discussions concerning the Divine Will, with which the student of theology should be familiar.
In this place it is sufficient to remark, that the Greek word OiXuy, and the corresponding English verb, to will, sometimes ex- press feeling, and sometimes a purpose. Thus in Matt, xxvii. 43, the words ct 6eXeL avrov are correctly rendered, " if he delight in him." Comp. Ps. xxii. 8. It is in this sense the word is used, when it is said that God wills all men to be saved. He cannot be said to purpose or determine upon any event which is not to come to pass. A judge may will the happiness of a man whom he sen- tences to death. He may will him not to suffer when he wills him to suffer. The infelicity in such forms of expression is that the word " will " is used in different senses. In one part of the sentence it means desire, and in the other purpose. It is perfectly consist- ent, therefore, that God, as a benevolent Being, should desire the happiness of all men, while he purposes to save only his own people.
F. The Will of Grod as the Crround of Moral Obligation. The question on this subject is. Whether things are right or wrong, simply because God commands or forbids them? Or, does He command or forbid them', because they are right or wrong for some other reason than his will ? According to some, the only reason that a thing is right, and therefore obligatory, is, that it tends to promote the greatest happiness, or the greatest good of the universe. According to others, a thing is right which tends to promote our own happiness ; and for that reason, and for that rea-
406 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. - Divine Attributks.
son alone, it is obligatory. If vice would make us happier than virtue, we should be bound to be vicious. It is a more decorous mode of expressing substantially the same theory, to say that the ground of moral obligation is a regard to the dignity of our own nature. It makes little difference whether it be our own dignity, or our own happiness, which we are bound to regard. It is self, in either case, to whom our whole allegiance is due. Others, again, place the ground of moral obligation in the fitness of things, which they exalt above God. There is, they affirm, an eternal and necessary difference between right and wrong, to which God, it is said, is as much bound to be conformed as are his rational creatui'es.
The common doctrine of Christians on this subject is, that the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation to all rational creatures. No higher reason can be assigned why anything is right than that God commands it. This means, (1.) That the divine will is the only rule for deciding what is right and what is wrong. (2.) That his will is that which binds us, or that to which we are bound to be conformed. By the word " will" is not meant any arbitrary purpose, so that it were conceivable that God should will right to be wrong, or wrong right. The will of God is the expression or revelation of his nature, or is deter miheobyltT so that his will, as revealed, makes known to us whatinfinite wis- dom and goodness demand. Sometimes Tilings are right simply because God has commanded them ; as circumcision, and other ritual institutions were to the Jews. Other things are right be- cause of the present constitution of things which God has ordained ; such as the duties relating to property, and the permanent relations of society. Others, again, are right because they are demanded by the immutable excellence of God. In all cases, however, so far as we are concerned, it is his will that binds us, and constitutes the difference between right^nd wrongj his will, that is, as the ex- ipFession of his infinite perfection. So that the ultimate foundation • of moral obligation is the nature of God.
§ 10. The Power of God.
A. Tlie Nature of Power ^ or, The Origin of the Idea.
We get the idea of power from our own consciousness. That
is, we are conscious of the ability of producing effects. Power in
man is confined within very narrow limits. We can change the
current of our thoughts, or fix our attention on a particular object,