and we can move the voluntary muscles of our body.. Beyond this our direct power does not extend. It is from this small measure of efficiency that all the stores of human knowledge and all the wonders of human art are derived. It is only our thoughts, voli- tions, and purposes, together with certain acts of the body, that are immediately subject to the will. For all other effects we must avail ourselves of the use of means. We cannot will a book, a picture, or a house into existence. The production of such effects requires protracted labor and the use of diverse appliances.
B. Omnipotence. It is by removing all the limitations of power, as it exists in us, that we rise to the idea of the omnipotence of God. We do not thus, however, lose the idea itself Almighty power does not cease to be power. We can do very little. God can do whatever He wills. We, beyond very narrow limits, must use means to accom- plish our ends. With God means are unnecessary. He wills, and it is done. He said, Let there be light ; and there was light. He, by a volition created the heavens and the earth. At the volition of Christ, the winds ceased, and there was a great calm. By an act of the will He healed the sick, opened the eyes of the blind, and raised the dead. This simple idea of the omnipotence of God, that He can do without effort, and by a volition, whatever He wills^is the highest conceivable idea of power, and is that which js^clearly presented in the Scriptures. In Gen. xvii. 1, it is said, *' I am the Almighty God." The prophet Jeremiah exclaims, *' Ah Lord God ! behold thou hast made the heavens and the earth by thy great power, and stretched out arm ; and there is nothing too hard for thee." (Jer. xxxii. 17.) God is said to have created all things by the breath of his mouth, and to uphold the universe by a word. Our Lord says, " With God all things are possible." (Matt. xix. 26.) The Psalmist long before had said, " Our God is in the heavens ; He hath done whatsoever He pleased." (Ps. cxv. 3.) And again, " Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did He in heaven, and in earth, in the seas, and all deep places." (Ps. cxxxv. 6.) The Lord God omnipotent reigneth, and doeth his pleasure among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth, is the tribute of adoration which the Scriptures everywhere render unto God, and the truth which they everywhere present as the ground of confidence to his people. This is all we know, and all we need to know on this subject ; and here we might rest satis- fied, were it not for the vain attempts of theologians to reconcile
408 PART L — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — Divine Atthibtttks.
these simple and sublime truths of the Bible with their philosophi- cal speculations.
C. The Negation of Power.
The sensuous school of philosopliers deny that there is any real efficiency or power in existence. Their principle is, that all knowl- edge is derived from the senses ; and consequently, that, as we can- not know anything of which the senses do not take cognizance, it is unphilosophical or unreasonable to admit the existence of anything else. Our senses, however, do not take cognizance of efficiency. It cannot be felt, or seen, or heard, or tasted. Therefore it does not exist. A cause is not that to which an effect is due, but simply that which uniforml}'- precedes it. All we can know, and all we can ratioaially believe, is the facts which affect our senses, and the order of their sequence ; which order, being uniform and necessary, has the character of law. This is the doctrine of causation pro- posed by Hume, Kant, Brown, Mill, and virtually by Sir William Hamilton ;and it is this principle which lies at the foundation of the Positive Philosophy of Comte. Of course, if there be no such thing as power, there is no such attribute in God as omnipotence..
It is sufficient to say, in this connection, in reference to this theory, (1.) That it is contrary to every man's consciousness. We are conscious of power, i. e., of the ability to produce effects. And consciousness has the same authority, to say the least, when it con- cerns what is within, as when it concerns what affects the senses. We are not more certain that our hand moves, than we are that we have the power to move, or not to move it, at pleasure. (2.) This theory contradicts the intuitive and indestructible con- victions of the human mind. No man believes, or can believe really and permanently, that any change or effect can occur with- out an efficient cause. The fact that one event follows another, is not the ultimate fact. It is intuitively certain that there must be an adequate reason for that sequence. Such is the universal judg- ment of mankind. (3.) The argument, if valid against the re- ality of power, is valid against the existence of substance, of mind, and of God. This is admitted by the consistent advocates of the principle in question. Substance, mind, and God, are as little under the cognizance of the senses as power ; and, therefore, if nothing is to be admitted but on the testimony of the senses, the existence of substance, mind, and God, must be denied. This prin- ciple, therefore, cannot be admitted without doing violence to oui whole rational, moral, and religious nature. In other words, it
$10. D.l THE POWEE OF GOD. 409
cannot be admitted at all ; for men cannot, pei'manently, either be- lieve or act contrary to the laws of their nature.
D. Absolute Power.
By absolute power, as understood by the schoolmen and some of the later philosophers, is meant power free from all the restraints of reason and morality. According to this doctrine, contradictions, absurdities, and immoralities, are all within the ' compass of the di- vine power. Nay, it is said that God can annihilate Himself. On this subject Des Cartes says, Deus " non voluit tres angulos trian- guli sequales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non posse. Sed contra .... quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessarioi aequales esse duobus rectis, idcirco jam hoc verum est, et fieri ali- ter non potest, atque ita de reliquis." ^ This " summa indifferen-^ tia," he says, " in Deo, summum est ejus omnipotentige argumen- tum." 2
It is, however, involved in the very idea of power, that it has reference to the production of possible effects. It is no more a limitation of power that it cannot effect the impossible, than it is of reason that it cannot comprehend the absurd, or of infinite goodness that it cannot do wrong. It is contrary to its nature. Instead of exalting, it degrades God, to suppose that He can be other than He is, or that He can act contrary to infinite wisdom and love. When, therefore, it is said that God is omnipotent because He can do whatever He wills, k is to be remembered that his will is det^j:^ joinedjjy his nature. It is certainly no limitation to perfection to say^hat itj;aj]iiot_be^jnap^rfect.
In this vieAv of the omnipotence of God, the great body of the theologians, especially among the Reformed, agree. Thus Zwin- gle ^ says : " Summa potentia non est nisi omnia possit, quantum ad legitimum posse attinet : nam malum facere aut se ipsum deponere aut in se converti hostiliter aut sibi ipsi contrarium esse posse im- potentia est, non potentia." Musculus,^ " Deus omnipotens, quia potest qufe vult, quseque ejus veritati, justitiae conveniunt." Keck- ermann,^ "Absolute possibilia sunt, quae nee Dei naturae, nee alia- rum rerum extra Deum essentiaa contradicunt." This scholastic doctrine of absolute power Calvin ^ stigmatizes as profane, " quod .... merito detestabile nobis esse debet."
1 Meditationes. Responsiones Sextce, vi. edit. Amsterdam, 1685, p. 160. 2 jf^d. p. 161. 3 De Providentia Dei, Epilogus. Opera, edit. Turici, 1841, vol. iv. p. 138
* See Loci Communes Theologici, edit. Basle, 1573, pp. 402-408.
6 Systema Theologim, lib. i. cap. v. 4; edit. Hanovise, 1603, p. 107.
• Institutio, m. xxiii. 2, edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. p. 148.
410 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — DniNE Attribotkb.