Potentia Ahsoluta and Potentia Ordinata. There is a sense of the terms in which absolute power is gen- erally recognized among theologians. A distinction is commonly made between the potentia ahsoluta and the potentia ordinata of God. By the latter is meant the efficiency of God, as exercised uniformly in the ordered operation of second causes ; by the former, his efficiency, as exercised without the intervention of second causes. Creation, miracles, immediate revelation, inspiration, and regeneration, ar^, to be referred to the potentia ahsoluta of God ; all his works of providence to his potentia ordinata. This distinc- tion is important, as it draws the line betAveen the natural and su- pernatural, between what is due to the operation of natural causes, sustained and guided by the providential efficiency of God, and what is due to the immediate exercise of his power. This distinc- tion, indeed, is rejected by the modern philosophy. God in cre- ating and sustaining the world, does it as a whole. Nothing is iso- lated. There is no individual act, but only a general efficiency on the part of God ; and, consequently, no particular event can be referred to his absolute power or immediate agency. Everything is natural. There can be no miracle, and no special providence.^
E. Confounding Will and Power. Another perversion of the Scriptural doctrine on this subject is, that which denies any distinction between will and power, or fac- ulty and act, in God. It is said that it is unphilosophical to say that God can do anything. We use the word " can " only in reference to difficulty to be overcome. When nothing stands in the way, when all opposition is precluded, then we no longer say, we can. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the nature of an abso- lute Being to say that He is able to do this or that.^ It is further denied that willing can be ascribed to God, if any difference be assumed between willing and doing. The ordinary definition of omnipotence. Potest quod vult, is to be rejected. It is admitted, that the distinction between will and power is unavoidable, if we determine the nature of God from the analogy of our constitution. As will and power are distinct in us, we are disposed to think they are distinct in Him. But this method of determining the attri- butes of God leads to the destruction of the true idea of an absolute being. In such a being, no such distinction can be admitted ; and
1 Strauss, i. p. 592. Schleiermacher, i. § 54. Werke, edit. Berlin, 1842, vol. ui. p. 285.
2 Bruch, p. 155.