from that of contingency on the other. It teaches that a man is free not only when his outward acts are determined by his will, but when his volitions are truly and properly his own, determined by nothino- out of himself but proceeding from his own views, feelings, and immanent dispositions, so that they are the real, intelligent, and conscious expression of his character, or of what is in his mind. This theory is often called the theory of moral or philosophical, as distinguished from physical, necessity. This is a most unfortu- nate and unsuitable designation. (1.) Because liberty and necessity are directly opposed. It is a contradiction to say that an act is free and yet necessary ; that man is a free agent, and yet that all his acts are determined by a law of necessity. As all the advocates of the theory in question profess to believe in the freedom of the human will, or that man is a free agent, it is certainly to be regret- ted that they should use language which in its ordinary and proper sense teaches directly the reverse. (2.) Certainty and necessity are not the same, and therefore they should not be expressed by the same word. The necessity with which a stone falls to the ground, and the certainty with which a perfectly holy being con- firmed in a state of grace will act holily, are as different as day and night. Applying the same term to express things essentially distinct tends to confound the things themselves. A man may be forced to do a thing against his will, but to say he can be forced to will against his will is a contradiction. A necessary volition is no volition, any more than white is black. Because in popular language we often speak of a thing as necessary when it is absolutely certain, and although the Scriptures, wa'itten in the language of ordinary life, often do the same thing, is no reason why in philosophical discussions the word should be so used as unavoidably to mislead. (3.) Using the word necessity to express the idea of certainty brings the truth into reproach. It clothes it in the garb of error. It makes Edwards use the language of Hobbes. It puts Luther into the category with Spinoza ; all Augustinians into the same class with the French ma- terialists. They all iise the same language, though their meaning iS as diverse as possible. They all say that the acts of men are necessary. When they come to explain themselves, the one class says they are truly and properly necessary in such a sense that they are not free, and that they preclude the possibility of moral character or responsibility. The other class say that they are necessary, but in such a sense as to be nevertheless free and per- fectly consistent with the moral responsibility of the agent. It is certainly a great evil that theories diametrically opposed to eacli
286 PART II. Ch. IX. — free agency.
other, that the doctrine of saints, and the doctrine of devils (to use Paul's language) should be expressed in the same words. We accordingly find the most respectable writers, as Reid and Stewart, arguing against Edwards as though he held the doctrine of Belshain.
By the old Latin writers the theory of moral certainty is com- monly designated Luhentia Rationalise or Rational Spontaneity. This is a much more appropriate designation. It implies that in every volition there are the elements of rationality and spontaneous action. In brutes there is a spontaneity but no reason, and there- fore they are not free agents in such a sense as to be the objects of approbation or disapprobation. In maniacs also there is self- determination, but it is irrational, and therefore not free. But w^herever reason and the power of self-determination or spontaneity are combined in an agent, he is free and responsible for his outward acts and for his volitions. This representation would satisfy Reid, who says, " We see evidently that, as reason without active power can do nothing, so active power without reason has no guide to direct it to any end. These two conjoined make moral liberty." ^
Tiie old writers, in developing their doctrine of rational spon- taneity were accustomed to say, the will is determined by the last judgment of the understanding. This is true or false as the lan- guage is interpreted. If by the last judgment of the understanding be meant the intellectual apprehension and conviction of the rea- sonableness and excellence of the object of choice, then none but the perfectly reasonable and good are always thus determined. Men in a multitude of cases choose that which their understanding condemns as wicked, trifling, or destructive. Or if the meaning be that every free act is the result of conscious deliberation, and consequent decision of the mind as to the desirableness of a given act, then again it cannot be said that the will follows the last dictate of the understanding. It is in reference probably to one or both of these interpretations of the language in question that Leibnitz says: "Non semper sequimur judicium ultimum intellectus practici, dum ad volendum nos determinamus ; at ubi volumus, semper se- quimur collectioneni omnium inclinationum, tam a parte rationum, tarn passionum, profectarum ; id quod saepenumero sine expresso intellectus judicio contingit.'' ^ But what is really meant by this expression is that the views or feelings which determine the will are themselves determined by the understanding. If I desir3 any-
1 Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 5; Works, Edinburgh, ]849, p. 61S 3 Wvih, edit. Geneva, 1708, vol. i. p. 15(i.