are entirely different things. One of these propositions may be affirmed and the other denied ; bnt if will and desire are confounded the distinction between these propositions is obliterated. It has often been remarked that the confusion of these two meanings of the word will is the great defect of President Edwards's celebrated work. He starts with a definition of the term, which makes it include all preferring, choosing, being pleased or displeased with, liking and disliking, and advocates a theory which is true, and applicable only to the will in the restricted sense of the word.
Motive.
Secondly, The word motive is often taken in different senses. It is defined to be anything which has a tendency to move the mind. Any object adapted to awaken desire or affection ; any truth or conception which is suited to influence a rational and sen- sitive being to a decision, is said to be a motive. This is what is called the objective sense of the word. In this sense it is very far from being true that the will is always determined by the strongest motive. The most important truths, the most weighty considera- tions, the most alluring objects, are often powerless, so far as the internal state of the mind is concerned. The word, however, is often used in a subjective sense, for those inward convictions, feel- ings, inclinations, and principles which are in the mind itself, and which impel or influence the man to decide one way rather than another. It is only in this sense of the term that the will is deter- mined by the strongest motive. But even then it must be admit- ted, as before remarked, that we have no criterion or standard by which to determine the relative strength of motives, other than their actual effect. So that to say that the will is determined by the strongest motive, only means that it is not self-determined, but that in every rational volition the man is influenced to decide one way rather than another, by something within him, so that the voli- tion is a revelation of what he himself is.
Cause.
Thirdly, The word cause is no less ambiguous. It sometimes means the mere occasion ; sometimes the instrument by which something is accomplished ; sometimes the efficiency to which the effect is due ; sometimes the end for which a thing is done, as when ■we speak of final causes ; sometimes the ground or reason why the effect or action of the efficient cause is so rather than otherwise. To say that motives are the occasional causes of volition, is consist- yoi.. II. 19
290 PART n. Cu. IX. — FREE AGENCY.
ent '.vith any theory of agency, whether of necessity or indiffer- ence ; to say tliat tliey are efficient causes, is to transfer the etti- ciency of the agent to the motives; but to say that they are the ground or reason why tlie voHtions are what they are, is only to say that every rational being, in every voluntary act, must have a reason, good or bad, for acting as he does. Most of the arguments against the statement that motives are the cause of volitions, ai'e iounded on the assumption that they are affirmed to be produc- ing causes, and that it is intended to deny that the agent is t!ie efficient cause of liis own acts ; whei'eas, the meaning simply is that motives are the reasons which determine the agent to as- sert his efficiency in one way rather than another. They are, however, truly causes, in so far as they determine the effect to be thus, and not otherwise. Parental love may induce a mother to watch by a sick child, and in this sense is the cause of her devo- tion, but she is none the less the efficient cause of all her acts of tenderness. Reid says, " either the man is the cause of tlie action, and then it is a free action, and is justly imputed to him, or it must have another cause, and cannot justly be imputed to the man."' ' This sup|)oses that the word cause has but one sense. In the case just supposed, the mother is the efficient, her love the rational cause or reason of her acts. Is it a denial of her free agency to say that her love determined her will in favour of attention instead of neglect?
Liberty.
Fourthly, No little ambiguity aries from confounding liberty of the will with liberty of the agent. These forms of expression are often used as equivalent. The same thing is perhai)s commonly mtended by saying, " The will is free," and " The agent is free."' It is admitted that the same thonglit may be properly expressed by these phrases. As we speak of freedom of conscience, when we mean to say that the man is free as to his conscience ; so we may speak of freedom of the will, when all we mean is, that the man is free in willing. The usage, however, which makes these expres- sions synonymous is liable to the following objections : (1.) Predi- cating liberty of the will is apt to lead to our conceiving of the will as separated from the agent ; as a distinct self-acting power in the soul. Or, if this extreme be avoided, which is not always the case, the will is reirarded as too much detached from the other faculties of the soul, and as out of sympathy with it in its varying states. The will is only the soul willing. The soul is of course a unit. A
I Active Potoers, Essay iv. ch. ix.; Works, Edinburgh, 1849, p. 695.