thing, it is because I appreliend it as suitable to satisfy soma craving of my nature. If I will anything because it is right, its being right is something for the understanding to discern. In other words, all the desires, affections, or feelings which determine the will to act must have an object, and that object by which the feehnc is excited and towards which it tends, must be discerned bv the understanding. It is this that gives them their rational character, and renders the determinations of the will rational. Any volition which does not follow the last dictate of the understanding, in this sense of the words, is the act of an idiot. It may be spontaneous, just as the acts of brutes are, but it cannot be free in the sense of being the act of an accountable person.
Another form under which this doctrine is often expi'essed is, that the will is as the greatest apparent good. This is a very common mode of stating the doctrine, derived from Leibnitz, the father of optimism, whose whole " Theodic^e " is founded on the assumption that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. By " good," writers of this class generally mean " adapted to pro- duce happiness," which is regarded as the summum honum. Their doctrine is that the will always decides in favour of what promises the greatest happiness. It is not the greatest real, but the greatest apparent good Avhich is said to determine the volition. A single draught from the bowl may appear to the drunkard, in the intensity of his craving, a greater good, i. e., as better suited to relieve and satisfy him, than the welfare of himself or family for life. This whole theory is founded on the assumption that happiness is the highest end, and that the desire of happiness is the ultimate spring of all voluntary action. As both of these principles are abhorrent to the great mass of cultivated, and especially of Christian minds; as men act from other and higher motives than a desire to promote their own happiness, there are few who, in our day, will adopt the doctrine that the will is as the greatest aj)parent good, as thus expounded. If, however, the word good be taken in a more com- prehensive sense, including everything that is desirable, whether as right, becoming, or useful, as well as suited to give happiness, then the doctrine is no doubt true. The will in point of fact always is detertnined in favour of that which under some aspect, or for some reason, is regarded as good. Otherwise men might choose evil as evil, which would violate a fundamental law of all rational and sensuous natures.
It is still more common, at least in this country, to say that the will is always determined by the strongest motive. To this mode
288 PART 11. Ch. IX. — free agency.
of statement there are two obvious objections. (1.) The ambiguity of the word motive. If that word be taken in one sense, the state • ment is true ; if taken in another, it is false. (2.) The impossibility of establishing any test of the relative strength of motives. If you make vivacity of feeling the test, then it is not true that the strong- est motive always prevails. If you make the effect the test, then you say that the strongest motive is that which determines the will, — which amounts to saying that the will is determined by that which determines it.
It is better to abide by the general statement. The will is not determined by any law of necessity ; it is not independent, indiffer- ent, or self-determined, but is always determined by the preceding state of mind ; so that a man is free so long as his volitions are the conscious expression of his own mind ; or so long as his activity is determined and controlled by his reason and feelings.
§ 2. Definition of Terms.
Before proceeding to give an outline of the usual arguments in support of this doctrine, it is important to state the meaning of the words employed. No one in the least conversant with discussions of this nature can have failed to remark how much difficulty arises from the ambiguity of the terms employed, and how often men appear to differ in doctrine, when in fact they only differ in language.
The Will.
First, the word will itself is one of those ambiguous terms. It is sometimes used in a wide sense, so as to include all the desires, affections, and even emotions. It has this comprehensive sense when all the faculties of the soul are said to be included under the two categories of understanding and- will. Everything, therefore, pertaining to the soul, that does not belong to the former, is said to belong to the latter. All liking and disliking, all preferring, all inclination and disinclination, are in this sense acts of the will. At other times, the word is used for the power of self-determination, or for that faculty by which we decide on our acts. In this sense only purposes and imperative volitions are acts of the will. It is obvious that if a writer affirms the liberty of the will in the latter sense, and his reader takes the word in the former, the one can never understand the other. Or if the same writer sometimes uses the word in its wide and sometimes in its narrow sense, he will 'nevitably mislead himself and others. To say that we have power over our volitions, and to say that we have power over our desires,