doctrine of contingency. All Augustinians maintain that a free act may be inevitabh' certain as to its occurrence. All Anti- Augustinians, whether Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, or Arminians, and most moral philosophers and metaphysicians, take the opposite ground. They teach that as the will has a self-determining power it may decide against all motives internal or external, against all influences divine or human, so that its decisions cannot be rendered inevitable without destroying their liberty. The very essence of liberty, they say, is power to the conti'ary. In other words, a free act is one performed with the consciousness that under precisely the same circumstances, that is, in the same internal as well as ex- ternal state of the mind, it might have been the opposite. Accord- ing to the one doctrine, the will is determined ; accordiuii; to the other, it determines itself. In tlie one case, our acts are or mav be inevitably certain and yet be free. In the other, in order to be free, they must be uncertain. We have already proved that this is a fair statement of the case ; that the advocates of moral neces- sity mean thereby certainty ; and that the advocates of contingency mean thereby uncertainty. We have admitted that the use of the word necessity, even when qualified by saying negatively, that it is not " absolute, physical, or mechanical," and that it is merely philosophical or moral, is unfortunate and inappropriate. And if any opponent of Augustine or Edwards say that all he denies is an absolute or physical necessity, and that he has no objection to the doctrine of certaint}'^, then the difference between him and Edwards is merely verbal. But the real controversy lies deeper. It is not the word, but the thing that is opposed. There is a real difference as to the nature of free agency ; and that difference concerns this very point : may the acts of free agents be rendered inevitably certain without destroying their liberty ?
Points of Agreement.
It may be well before proceeding further, to state the points as to which the parties to this controversy are agreed.
1. They are agreed that man is a free agent, in such a sense as to be responsible for his character and acts. The dispute is not about the fact, but the nature of free agency. If any one denies that men are responsible moral agents, then he belongs to the school of necessity, and is not a party to the discussion now under consideration.
2. It is agreed as to the nature of free agency that it supposes both reason and active power. Mere spontaneity does not consti-