But neither the plan of our work permits us to withdraw from this undertaking, though unequal to it, nor, perhaps, hath Maccovius satisfied his readers in every particular. Indeed, some things seem necessary to be added, that this controversy with Twisse may occasion no trouble to any one for the future. Tliis veteran leader, then, so well trained to the scholastic field, going before and pointing us out the way, we shall, with your good leave, reader, briefly try these argu- ments by the rule of Scripture and right reason ; and I doubt not but we sliall clearly demonstrate, to all impartial judges of things, that this learned man hath by no means proved what he intended.
CHAPTER XIII.
Twisse's first argument — Its answer — A trifling view of the divine attributes — Whether God could, by his absolute power, forgive sins without a satisfaction — To let sins pass unpunished implies a contradiction; and that twofold — Wh;it these contradictions are — Whether God may do what man may do — Whether every man may renounce his riglit — Whether God cannot forgive sins because of his justice — The second argument — Its answer — Distinctions of necessity — God doth no work without himself from absolute necessity — Conditional necessity — Natural necessity* twofold — God doth not punish to tlie extent of his power, but to the extent of his justice — God always acts with a concomitant liberty — An argument of the illustrious Vossius considered — God " a consuming- fire,' but an intellectual one — An exception of Twisse's — Whether, independent of the divine appoinlment, sin would merit punishment — In punishment, what things are to be considered — The relation of obedience to reward and disobedi- ence to punishment not the same — The comparison between mercy and justice by Vossius improperly instituted.
The first argument of this great man is this : " If God cannot for- give sins without a satisfaction, it is either because he cannot on account of his justice, or because he cannot by his power; but neither of tliesc can be aflirmed."
Ans. That enumeration of the divine attributes, as to the present cause, is mere trifling: for what God cannot do in respect of oiie attribute, he can do in respect of none; or, in other words, that which
ARGUMENT.S OF TWISSE REFUTED. 587
cannot be done because of any one essential property, cannot be done because of them all. As, for instance, if there be any thing which God cannot do in respect of truth, he cannot do that in any manner or in any respect. In the acts of the divine will, purely free, the case is otherwise ; for, in a divided sense, God may do any thing (that is, he may create new worlds), which if a decree of creating this and no other be supposed, he could not do. But the objects presented to any attribute of the divine nature admit not of various respects, but are in their own kind absolutely necessary ; therefore, we deny the minor. Neither in respect of justice nor in respect of power can this be done.
But our learned antagonist leads the proof of it through its parts; and, first, after a marginal animadversion on a certain oversight of Piscator, he affirms " That it cannot be maintained that God cannot forgive sins by his power, without a satisfaction."
" For," says he, " if God by his might or absolute power cannot pardon sin, then it is absolutely impossible for sin to be pardoned, or not to be punished ; therefore, not to pardon sin consists of con- tradictory terms. The contradiction, then, ought to be shown, as none appears from the formal terras. And, on the other hand, it is evi- dent that man not only can pardon, but that it is his duty to pardon his enemies when they transgress against him."
Ans. The non-punishment of sin implies a contradiction, — not, in- deed, formally and in the terms, but virtually and eminently in re- spect of the thing itself: for, in the first place, it implies that God is the Lord of mankind by a natural and indispensaljle right, but that mankind are not subject to him, neither as to obedience nor as to punishment, which would be the dhect case if sin should pass with impunity; for that natural and necessary dependence being cut off (which, also, in another respect is- moral) which accords to a rational creature in respect of its Creator and supreme Lord, which really comes to pass by means of sin, it cannot be renewed or made amends for but by punishment. In the second place, to hate sin, that is, to will to punish it, and not to hate sin, to will to let it pass unpunished, are manifestly contradictory.
If you say that God hath it in his power not to hate sin, you say that he hath the contrary in his power, — that is, that he can love sin ; for if he hate sin of his free will, he may will the contrary, for " the divine will is not so determinately inclined towards any secondary object by any thing in itself that can justly oppose its inclination to its opposite." This Scotus maintains, and Twisse agrees with him. But to will good and to love justice are not less natural to God than to be himself Here is, then, a double contradiction in that assertion of this very learned man, namely, " That God can forgive sin abso- lutely, without any satisfaction received."