" But," says our celebrated antagonist, " if disobedience thus de- serve punishment, why should not obedience in like manner deserve a reward, for no reason to the contrary can be assigned?" I \vish this learned man had not so expressed himself, for he will never be able to prove that the relation of obedience to reward and disobe- dience to punishment is the same; for between obedience and the reward there intervenes no natural obligation. God is brought imder an obligation to no one for any kind of obedience; for " after we have done all, we are still unprofitable servants." But God's right that rational creatures should be subject to him, either by obe- dience or a vicarious punishment, is indispensable. In a word, obe- dience is due to God in such a manner, that from the nature of the thing he can be debtor to none in conferring rewards; but disobe- dience would destroy all dependence of the creature upon God, un- less a recompense be made by punishment.
The celebrated Vossius, again, reasons improperly, in the passage before quoted, from a comparison made between justice and mercy. " The question is not," says he, '•' whether it be just that a satisfac- tion be received? but whether it be unjust that it should not be re- ceived? for it doth not follow that if God be merciful in doing one thing or another, that he would be unmerciful in not doing it." I acknowledge that it docs not follow: for although mercy be natural to God as to the habit, yet because there is no natural obligation
502 A DISSERTATION OX DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II.
between it and its proper object, it is as to all its acts entirely free; for the nature of the thing about which it is employed is not indis- pensable, as we have shown before to be the ease with regard to justice. So much for the learned Twisse's second argument, with the consideration of it.
CHAPTER XIV.
Twisse's third argument — A dispensation with regard to the punishment of sin, what, and of what kind — The nature of punishment and its circumstances — The Instance of tliis learned opponent refuted — Tlie considerations of reward- ing and punishing different — How long, and in what sense, God can dispense witli the punislmient due to sin — God the supreme goverr.or of the Jewish polity; also, the Lord of all — The fourth argument of Twisse — The answer — Whether God can inflict punishment on an innocent person — In what sense God is more willing to do acts of kindness than to punish — What kind of will- ingness that assertion respects — The conclusion of the answer to Twisse's prmcijjal arguments.
The third argument is this : " God can inflict a milder punish- ment than sin deserves; therefore, he can by his absolute power suspend the punishment altogether."
Ans. I answer, that the punishment which a sin deserves maybe considered in a twofold point of view: — 1. As by means of it God compels to order a disobedient creature, that hath cast off its depend- ence on his supreme and natural dominion, in such a manner that his will may be done with that creature, that is itself unwilling to do it; and in this point of view he cannot inflict a more mild punish- ment than sin deserves. Yea, properly speaking, in this respect it cannot be said to admit of degrees, either milder or more severe. And in this sense we simply deny the foregoing proposition. 2. It may be considered in this other pohit of view, — namely, as God, for the greater manifestation of his glory, hath assigned to it modes, degrees, and other circumstances. But if punishment be considered in this view, we deny the sequel;^ for though it be granted that he exerciseth liberty as to the modes and degrees, as these flow^ from the free api^ointmcnt of God, it doth not follow that the punishment itself, so far as the nature of punishment is preserved in it, and which takes its rise from the natural justice of God, can be altogether dis- pensed with.
What says our learned antagonist to this? He supj^oses the author of the supplement his opponent, and discusses his opinion in a variety of subtile reasonings, in his answer concerning the extent and dif-
' Namely, That God, by his aljsolute power, can suspend the punishment of sin alto- gothor. — Tk.
ARGUMENTS OF TWISSE REFUTED. 593
ferent degrees of justice. But he confesses that these have no rela- tion to Piscator; and as tliey are of no avail to the argument, we therefore pass over the consideration of them.
But this learned gentleman has still something to oppose to our reasoning ; for he thus proceeds, " God may reward beyond merit ; therefore, he may punish less than what is merited." But this reason is evidently of no force ; for besides that arguments from opposites do not hold always good in theology, as hath been shown in various instances by Maccovius, we have before demonstrated at large that the relation between remunerating grace and punitory justice is not the same.^ Moreover, these considerations all along arise not from the nature of punishment, but from its degrees, about which we have no controversy, for we have never said that God in punish- ing sins acts without any concomitant liberty, which respects those degrees.