588 A DISSERTATION ON DIVINE JUSTICF. [PAET II.
" But it is manifest," says he, ''that man not only can pardon, but that it is his duty to pardon his enemies; and, therefore, this does not imply a contradiction."
A71S. The supposition is denied, that God may do what man may do. That learned man raises this objection himself, that man may sin, which God cannot do, and at great length, and with much eiTidi- tion, explains away this example. But as this instance of Twisse's is not quite satisfactory to us, we think jjroper to proceed in a different manner.
I say, then, in the first place, that divine and human forgiveness are plainly of a different kind. The forgiveness of man only respects the hurt; the forgiveness of God respects the guilt Man pardons sins so far as any particular injury hath been done himself; God pardons sin as the good of the universe is injured. Secondly, Neither is it in the power of every man to let sins pass unpunished, yea, of none absolutely to whom the right of punishing is competent; for although a private 2)erson may recede from his right, which for the most part is of charity, yet it is by no means allowed to a pithlic person to re- nounce his right, which is a right of government, especially if that renunciation should in any way turn out to the hurt of the public. In the third place, then, I say that that instance is nothing to the purpose ; for altliough a private person may, at certain times, renounce his right and dominion in certain cases, and ought to do so, it doth not follow from that that God, whose right and dominion is natural and indispensable, and which he cannot renounce unless he deny himself, can do the same. In the fourth place, the non-punishment of sin is an injury to the universe; for the glory of divine justice would be affronted with impunity.
Our celebrated antagonist proceeds to the consideration of divine justice. " But neither," says he, " can it be consistently said that God cannot do this because of his justice, if it be supposed that he can do it by his power. But Scotus reasons with more judgment and accu- racy on this point. ' The divine will is not so inclined towards any secondary object by any thing in itself,' says he, ' that can oppose its being justly inclined towards its opposite in the same manner, as Avitliout contradiction it may will its opposite; otherwise, it may Avill absolutely andnotjustly, which is inconsistent withdivine perfection.'"
Ans. We maintain that God from his nature cannot do this, and, tlierefore, that he cannot either by his power or his justice ; and as our learned o.ntagonist produces no argument to prove that God can do it without resistance from his justice, but what flows from this false supposition, that he can do it by his power, it is not necessary to give ourselves any trouble on this head. But to Scotus we answer: The divine will may incline to things opposite, in respect of the egresses of all those divine attributes which constitute and create
ARGUMENTS OF TWISSE REFUTED. 589
objects to themselves, but not in respect of those attributes which have no egress towards their objects but upon a condition supposed. As, for instance: God may justly speak or not speak with man; but it being supposed that he wills to speak, the divine will cannot be in- different whether he speak truth or not. So much for his first prin- cipal argument.
The second is this: " If God cannot let sin pass unpunished, then he must punish it from an absolute necessity; but this no one can maintain consistently with reason."
This consequence the learned doctor supposes, without any argu- ment to support it; but we deny the consequence, nor will he ever be able to prove that there is no other kind of necessity but an abso- lute necessity. There is also a necessity arising from a supposed con- dition, and which deprives not the agent of a concomitant liberty. God could not but create the world; but God did not create the world from an absolute necessity, although it was necessary upon a supposition that it should be created. It is necessary that God should speak truly, but he doth not speak from an absolute necessity; but it being supposed that he wills to speak, it is impossible that he should not speak truly. We say, therefore, that God cannot but punish sin, or that he necessarily punishes sin ; not, however, from an absolute necessity of nature, as the Father begets the Son, but upon the suppositions^ before mentioned, — by a necessity which excludes an antecedent indifference but not a concomitant liberty in the agent, for in punishing sins he acts by volition and with understanding.
"But that necessity," you will say, "of what kind soever it be, flows from the nature of God, not his will or decree; but all necessity of nature seems to be absolute." I acknowledge, indeed, that all neces- sity of nature, considered in the first act and thing signified,^ is abso- lute in its kind ; but in the second act, and in its exercise, it is not so. The reader will easily perceive now that our very learned an- tagonist had no reason for freely supposing that consequence ; which I reckon the very lowest of all the devices he has fallen upon. " If, then," says he, " God must punish sin from a natural necessity, he must necessarily punish it to the extent of his power ;" but this, with great accuracy, he shows to be absurd, by a variety of arguments.