Ans. Maccovius hath, some time ago, very clearly answered this reasoning. We reject his consequence, as built upon a false supposi- tion; for that necessity from which God punisheth sin does not re- quire that he should punish it to the extent of his power, but so far as is just. We do not conceive God to be a senseless, inanimate
' Kamely, That he -willecl to create a rational being, and to permit it to transgress the law of its creation. — Te.
' " Actu primo et signato," — " In its first and manifested act, its first act and manifes- tation."— Ed.
590 A DISSERTATI >N ON DIVINE JUSTICE. [PART II,
agent, as if he acted from ]-)rinciplcs of nature, after a natural manner, without a concomitant liberty; for he doth all things freely, with understanding and by volition, even those things which by supjoosi- tion he doth necessarily, according to what his most holy nature requires.
The argument which the celebrated Vossius uses against our opi- nion is of no greater weight.^ " Every agent," says that very learned man, " that acts naturally, acts upon an object naturally receptive of its action : wherefore, if to punish were natural, namely, in that ac- ceptation which necessity carries with it, such action could not pass from the person of a sinner to another person."
But this learned man is mistaken when he imagines that we affirm God to be such a natural agent as must, without sense and immediately, operate upon the object that is receptive of it, in a manner altogether natural, and without any concomitant liberty, — that is, without any free act of understanding or volition; for al- though God be " a consuming fire," he is an intellectual one. Nor is a sinner alone an object properly receptive of the exercise of God's vindicatory justice, as he hath committed the ti'ansgressions in his own person ; for antecedent to every act of that justice, properly so called, in respect of the elect, God appointed a surety, and this surety being appointed, and all the sins of the elect laid upon him, he in their room and stead is the proper object of this vindicatory justice, so far as relates to their sins. " For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him," 2 Cor. v. 21.
But Twisse thus replies, " If God punish as far as he can with justice, — that is, as far as sin deserves, — then it must be either as far as sin deserves according to the free constitution of God, or without any regard to the divine constitution. If according to the divine constitution, this is nothing else but to assert that God punishes not so far as he can, but so far as he wills. If without any regard to the divine constitution, then without the divine constitution sin so deserves punishment that God ought to punish sin because of his justice. But I conclude this to be false in this manner: If disobe- dience deserve punishment in this manner, — that is, without the divine constitution, — therefore obedience will also, in like manner, deserve a reward without the divine constitution; for no reason can be- shown that any one should mauitain that even angels have merited, by their obedience, that God should reward them with celestial glory."
But although these arguments are specious, yet, strictly considered, they have no greater weight than those already discussed; for in the
' At the end of llie " Defcnsio Fidei CatlinliciV! de Satisfiictione Christi," by Grotius, there is appended " (x. J. Vossii Rcsponsio ad llerni. Ihivenspcvgeri Judicium dc eodeni." It is in this "Ilosponsio" that tlic sentiments refuted hy Owcu occur. — Ed.
ARGUMENTS OF TWISSE REFUTED. 591
punisliment of sin two tilings are to be considered: — 1. The punisli- ment itself, so far as it is in its own nature sometliing grievous and troublesome to the creature, and proper to recover the violated right of God. In this respect we say that sin merits punishment antece- dently to every free act of the divine will, or to the divine constitu- tion; or, if you would rather have it thus expressed, that it is just that God should inflict punishment, considered as such, on the trans- gressor, without regard to any free constitution: for if, without regard to such a constitution, sin be sin, and evil, evil, — and unless it be so, to hate the greatest and best of Beings may be the highest virtue, and to love him the greatest vice, — why may not punishment be due to it without regard to such a consideration? 2. In punishment, the mode, time, and degree are especially to be considered. In respect of these God punishes sin according to the divine constitu- tion ; for the justice of God only demanding punishment in general, as including in it the nature of punishment, nothing hinders but that God should freely appoint the mode and degree of it. He punishes them because it is just that he should do so, and conse- quently indisj)ensably necessary. He punishes in one mode or in anotlier, in one degree or in another, because, according to his wis- dom, he hath determined freely so to do. What we understand l)y modes and degrees of punishment shall be afterward explained.