42, jM. 4). With Duns the will is cntiitljjto with libenm arbitriwn; what it does is cerfif' evkable, while the mtellect obeys neccoitjC^^Cna ii, d. 26). The function of Uie latter is to faa*' the will the material which it combines, tkfi|«^ ity being given to it of willing entire op|sA«*' ? Oxon. I, dut, 89)" (Erdmann, transbted by Suite Amer. Preab. Seview, April, 1866, p. 299>
On the Theology of Scotus, we take the fcDirt horn Erdmann's article just dted : " The peeaiff* of Duns's psychology, as well as his deristioente^ in fh)m Thomas, reflect themselves in the ma*'; which he views the essence of God and tbe tear' man, and, therefore, in his theology snd ^^ to his theology: smce the existence of God WP* known without supernatural illumfaiition, ti^ * therefore, ex purig naturaHbut, a knowledge d^^ vine essence. But just as the former «^^ proved ^priori, the latter also cannot be deri«^ »« the highest metaphysical idea of the eat (71<«^ ^j but we raise ourselves to it by proceedinf fr« * veitigimm and the imago of God. Our kw**^ ' the essence of God is therefore not bitoiti«t'f * stractive (A9». Paris. Prol. 911. 2). Tbefist"*^ the human soul between the imieBectm, v^^ is the memory and the will, must, and ftst ff*^ be found in the original ground of man, ii ^ cordfaigly, m God, understandmg and wiUin^* tinguished, of which the former acts »o«w**\ . latter libere; the fbrmer is the groond snd sob"^ necessity, the latter of all contingency, ind *f^ may be named the possibility of the contingeBts (Rep. Pane, ii, rf. i, ^ 8; ibid, i, d. 40). lM*f now, as these two determinations (BesthnmoBgeo;
DUNS SCOTUS
915
DUNS SCOTUS
) foandatkm of Duns's doctrine of the Trinity, since ) Son, as Verbum, has his ground in the memoria rfeda, the Holy Ghost, on the otiker hand, in the ratio operated through the will (JRep, Paris, i, J. 18 ; . Oxon. i, d, lOet al.), he does not hesitate to as- be to the natural man such capacity as that he may ow the Trinity (^QuodL qu, 14). These intra-divine ations (notUmaUd) through which the three persons i, are the first deductions resulting fh>m the essence
God, and are Uierefore to be derived from the own easenticdilna (ibid. qu. 1). The case is other- se with every relation of God ad extra. For, since , out of Grod proceeds from the divine will, and this Qse acts corditufenter (Op. Ozon. i, d. 39), it can by
means be proved tiiat anytliing out of God must ist, and that it must exist as it is. Truly lus ovn ing does Grod know and will of necessity ; all else is ly secundaria voHtum (Rep. Paris, i, d. 17). That )d might have created all things other than he has, that he might do all things otherwise than he does, nnot be proved a logical impossibility, an incompas- nlitas contrariorwn; we can therefore only say, in e course of the established order chosen by God, this
that will or will not happen (Rep. Paris, iv, d. 49, 1. 11). Such an established order, limits which Gk>d IS voluntarily fixed for himself, is postulated by nns, because he distinguishes creation and preserva- >n, i. e. bringing out of nothing into being, and out
being into being, as two essentially distinct rela- )n8 of God to things, or, rather, of things (Quodl. qu. I) to God. (Op. Oxon. i, d. 80 ^ 2.) But it must iver be forgotten that the ground why this particu- r order was established is to be found purely in the easure of God. Therefore, although it is true that od has created all things according to ideas which receded the things in his intelligence, yet these arche- "pal forms have by no means determined his creating ; ast of all has he chosen any one form because it was le better. Rather it is only the better for the very iason that God has chosen it (Op. Oxon. ii, d. 19). here is, therefore, a scientific knowledge of the Trini- 7 ; of the creation there is none. It is with the in- imation precisely as it is with the creation. Had rod willed, we might have become stone ; there is no lore impossibility in that than there was in lus be- nning man. Precisely the same is true of redemp- lon through the death of Christ. A proof of the ne- Bssity of this is not possible. It is simply the pleas- re of God that the death of the guiltless one should ecome the ransom for the guilty (Op. Oxon. ill, d. 7, tt. 1 ; d. 20 ; iv, d. 16). (Around this point revolve iie controversies of the Scotists and Thomists respect- ig the merits of Christ.) Predsely as it must be said f these dogmas that they are certain, not through sci- ntific proofB, but through the jbiet infusa (ibid. d. 24), ven so must we say of the moral commandments rfaich are given us. It is not because it is evil that tod has forbidden us this or that, but it is evil because e has forbidden it. Had he commanded murder or ther trangressions, they would have been no trans- Tessions and no sin (ibid. d. 87). The last adduced •rinciple forms a convenient transition to his ethics. Soever, like Thomas, lays the greater stress on the heoretical side of the soul, must, with Aristotle, put heory above practice, and with such a one, if the Christian idea of blesseidness be added, it must assume I peculiar form. Here, therefore, blessedness is con* eiyed as the knowing and beholding of God, as delec- f^ in God, and therefore, as a theoretic enjoyment, ^ith Duns, who allows to the will precedence over he thinking power, the matter must naturally take mother form. The authority of Aristotle alarms him »ot; it is, in his view, only the philosopher, with his «inporal blessedness, who is opposed to him, when he Jimself mahitains, as the Christian and theological riew, that love, therefore the will, confers the highest ^essedoess, so that it seems to him almost too quie-