to develop the idea of the absolute by antagonisms through all its successive stadia. With him the pri- mary element of logic consisted in the oneness of the subjective and objective. Instinctive knowledge oidy regards the object without considering itself. But con- sciousness, besides the former, contains a perception of itself, and embraces, as three stages of progress, con- sciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Pure logic, according to Hegel, is divided into, 1. The logic of be- ing ; 2. The logic of qualified nature ; 3. The logic of the idea.
In 1825, Richard "Whately, afterwards archbishop of Dublin, published an article in the Knajdopctdia Mttro- polilana, which, having been expanded and printed as his Elements of Logic, was soon after extensively adopt- ed as a text-book both in England and America. This publication has justly been considered as constituting an a^ra in the study of logic in English-speaking coun- tries. The principles of Kant's Kritik of Pure Reason were not extensively introduced into Great Britain until after 1836, when Sir WiUiam Hamilton began his lectures in the University of Edinburgh. See Hamilton. Al- though Hamilton took opposite ground to Whateh' in reference to the essential character of logic, yet both were admirers and exponents of the A nalytic ef Aristotle. Thus the reawakened taste tor logical studies during the current century arose from a restoration, by different methods, of the old logic which had come down from the early ages, and survived all the opposition and ridicule of the modern centuries. It is worthy of especial note that none of the systems put forth by Ramus, Descar- tes, Locke, or Condillac, and their several modifiers, has been able to stand the test of time like that of the old philosophers and schoolmen. This fact may be accept- ed as proving that the syllogism indicates substantially the process which takes place in all minds in tlie act of reasoning. Notwithstanding this small demonstration, and a few other points of general concurrence, the sci- ence of logic, which has been the subject of human study for more than two thousand years, remains still incomplete. Many of its principles and processes are yet in continued and active dispute. Since Whately and Hamilton, Mr. John Stuart Mill has written an elaborate work in which he depreciates the syllogism and magnifies induction. But his theories in reference to both bear the stamp of Comte's empirical positivism.
The chief logical discussion of the present day re- volves around tlie " New Analytic of Logical Forms," or the quantification of the predicate introduced by Sir William Hamilton. This new analytic, which is chiefly valuable for its enlargement of the hitherto narrow sphere of formal logical praxis, is an emanation from the metaphysics of Kant, being grounded upon certain principles of the Kritik of Pure Reason. Its theor\-, although illustrated by an ingenious system of notation, was left in a somewhat crude state by Hamilton, hut has been ably elaborated by jNIansel and Thomson, of Eng- land, and Bowen and Mahan. of America. While these writers seem to think that they have attained the end of all logical perfection. Dr. M'Cosh, of Princeton, charges their whole system with fundamental error in presup- posing "that there areTorms in the mind which it im- poses on objects as it contemplates them." To explode this error is the avowed object of Jl'Cosh's recent trea- tise, in which, while he falls back for confirmation upon the old logic, he claims to unfold laws which were not noticed by the old logicians. The characteristic of his work is a more elaborate treatment of the notion than has taken place since the publication of the Port-Royal Logic. Thus logic seems destined to pass down to com- ing centuries as it has descended from the past, a sub- ject of endless debate, but one from which each success- ive generation derives its advantage in the very process of debate.
See Hallam's Lite rut U7-e of Europe ; Blakey's Tlisto?-- ical Sketch of L.ogic ; Kant's Ki-itik; Hegel's U'isseri- scluift der Logik ; Whately 's Elements of Logic ; Sir
LOGOS
491
LOGOS
William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic; Mansel's Prole- (joim-na Lotjica ; Thomson's 7>a2('s of Thought ; Elements of Logic, by H. P. Tappan, by W. D. AVilson, by C. K. True, by H. Coppeo, by J. K. Boyd, by H. N. Day, by A. Schuyler, by L. H. Atwater; System of Logic, by John Stuart Mill ; Science of Logic, by Asa Mahan ; Formal Logic, by James M'Cosh, (D. P. K.)
Logos (Adyoc, a tcord, as usually rendered), a spe- cial term in Christology, in consequence of its use as such by the apostle John, especially in the opening ver- ses of his Gospel. We base the former part of our arti- cle on the subject upon the brief but lucid exposition found in Bcngel's Gnomon (Amer. edit, by Profs. Lewis and Vincent, p. 53G sq.).
1. Rendering. — The general meaning of Logos in ev- ery such connection is the Word, said s\'mbolically of the law-giving, creative, revealing activity of God. This is naturally suggested here by the obvious refer- ence to Gen. i, 1,3.
Many have seen in this terra but a bold personifica- tion of the wisdom or reason of God, as in Prov. viii, 22. But this sense oi Logos does not occur in the New Test., and is excluded by the reference to the history of crea- tion. Besides, the repeated "with God" (verses 1, 2) compels us to distinguish the Logos from God ; the words •' became flesh" (ver. 14) cannot be said of an at- tribute of God; and the Baptist's testimony, verse 15, in direct connection with this introduction (compare also such sayings of Christ as in ch. viii, 58; xvii, 5). show clearly that John attributes personal pre-existence to the Logos. Similarly, every attempt to explain away this profound sense ofL^ogos is inadequate, and most are un- grammatical. See Wisdom.