Stoddard, Solomon, a Congregational minister, was born in Boston. Mass., in 1(>43, and was graduated at Harvanl College in UW2. He was afterwards ap- pointed a fellow. His health being impaired, he went to Barbadoes as chaplain to governor .Serle, anil preaclied to the Dissenters on that island near two years. After his return, he began to preach at Northampton in UK!'.), received a call to become their n)inister March 4, ItiTO, and was constituted such Sept. 11, 1()72. He continued in that place till his death, Feb. 11, 1720. His colleague, Mr. Kdwards. succeeded him. Mr. Stoddard was a learned man, well versed in religious controversies, and himself an acute tlisputant. He engaged in a controversy with Increase Mather res^iecting the Lord's supper, unfortu- nately maintaining that the sacrament was a converting ordinance, and that all Ijaptized persons not scandalous in life may lawfully approach the table, though they know themselves to be unconverted or destitute of true religion. As a preacher his discourses were plain, ex- perimental, searching, and argumentative. He was blessed with great success. He used to say that he had five harvests; and in these revivals there was a general cry, ■• What must I do to be saved?" lie was so diligent in his studies that he left a considerable number of writ- ten sermons which he had never jireached. From 16(17 to 1074 he held the oHicc of librarian to Cambridge (be- ing the tirst who ever held it). He published, besides several sermons, The Doctrine of Instituted Churches (Ivondon, 1700, 4to) : — .4 Guide to Christ, or the Way of/Jin-rliiir/ .'Sdii/s in the Wny to Conversion (1714), com- piled for young ministers: — .4 Treatise concerning Con- version:— The il'ay to Knoio Sincerity and //y/xirri.ty (1719) : — A n»werlo Cases of Conscience ( 1 722) : — I Vhither God is not A nijry vilh the Counti-y fir Doinij so Little towards the Conrersiim <ft/ie Indians (1723) •.—Safely of .AppKirliiij at the Jnd'/went in the Rii/hteon.tness of Christ. Tbitlasr work was republished at IMinbnrgh (lfl)2,8vo). See miAioth. Sacra, .Jidy, IK.-)3; Meth. Quar. Rev. Jan. \H:)'J; Sew-Knyluiukr, Nov. 1858; North Amer. liei: Jan. IK.iO.
Stoic Philosophy, the body of doctrine held and taugbi by ihf Siolcs, or followers of Zeno. It was an otr^hoot from the school of Socrates, but the [)lant was very indikc the other shoota from the same root. It was thoroughly syncrelinlic; an<l its separate doctrines, often nuicli disguised and strangely distorted, nuiy be reailily traced to earlier systems. The philosophv was like Corinthian brass, the result of the fusion of many di».iimilar materials, and unlike any that entered into iu« composition. The chiefs and advocates of the creed Ixinsted ot its marvellous symmetry and perfect organi- zation. They lauded the "admirabilis com[K>sitio diwi- phii;e NIC n-.hbiliMpie rerinn or<l<p. t^ua', per deos im-
inortales! (. niirari-? (,»ui>l enim aut in natura,
«|ua nihil est aptius, nihil des.riplius. aut in operibus
mium faclitt tai
conipositum tamijue cou)pactum et
coagmentatum inveniri potest? Quid posterius priori non convenit? C^uid sequitur quod non respondeat superiori? Quid non sic aliud ex. alio nectitur, ut non, si unam litteram moveris. labent omnia? Nee tamen quid(|uain est, quod moveri possit" (Cicero, Be Fin. iii, 22, 74). There is some apparent justilication for this confident gloritication. The "lucidus ordo" is manifest in the Stoic system, but it is superficial and factitious. There is an artificial symmetry and an ingenious coap- tation of parts whicii \vere never meant for each other. The smooth anil wiiniing exterior is deceptive. Like the "vvhited sepulchre," it is "filled with dead men's bones." The Stoic philosophy was full of extrava- gances, incoherences, and contradictions, which were softened down or reconciled only by violent interpreta- tions, aiul the constant exercise of dialectical legerde- main. Its opponents exposed its innumerable petit and grand larcenies. More dispassionate Judges, like Plu- tarch, wrote treatises to exhibit its internal discrepances. It was with good reason charged with gross absurdities, and was censured as a notable justification of the sneer, OuCei> tTTi Twv KaXovptitioi' ipi\o(T6(pii)v a(pt\oao<pMrs- pov (Athen. Deipn. xiii, i>3). Nevertheless, the philoso- phy of the Stoics is sufHciently distinct and character- istic to merit the eminent and enduring ascendency which it enjoyed as one of the great Hellenic schools, and to invite definite appreciation as a philosophic creed. I'hilosophy, according to the Stoics, was the art and practice of virtue (" Philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem" [Seneca. Episf. xiv, 1,8]). It was studied that it might be practiced ; it was practiced that it might be learned; it was the theory and rule of a wise and virtuous life. The essentially ethical char- acter and the practical tendency of the philosophy were manifested from the outset. Aristo of Chios regarded nothing but morals as belonging to the domain of phi- losophy, and ethics always constituted its main and de- terminant part. Morality was its aim, its "ratio essen- di;" all the rest was its "ampla" or "curta supellex," its garniture or its scaffolding. For this everything was ilevised; to this everything converged; and to this all other things were fitted. Incongruities were blink- ed, were disregarded, were masked, or were welcomed if they aided, or did not obstruct, the attainment of the main object. Extravagances and paradoxes were cor- dially entertained if they conduced to the main purpose. Some of the Stoic chiefs narrowed the range of specula- tion to this single object ; others, and notably Zeno him- self, Chrysippus, and I'osidonius, embraced in their teach- ings the whole domain of knowledge; but always in subordination to the pursuit of virtue and the wisdom "whereunto all other things shall be adiled." Philoso- phy, according to the Stoics, should be — 1. Practical; 2. In conformity with reason; 3. In conformity with nat- ure. The "jus et norma natuni;" ran through all the ramifications of Stoic doctrine. To be jjractical, philos- ophy must be rational ; to be rational, it must be in per- fect consonance with the constitution of man and with the process of the universe. The act of virtue must therefore rest on the knowledge of reason and of nature. This was as streiuiously insisted upon by Zeno and all his disciples as by C.-n-lyle, though in far other guise.