(2.) Veritas cocpntionis, or truth of knowledge. Truth, as pre<licated of knowledge, is the conformity of t)ur knowledge with the reality of the object known ; for, as knowledge is the knowledge of something, when a tiling is known as it is that knowledge is formally true. To know that tire is hot is true knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the tiling or object known with true knowledge.
(3.) Veritas sir/ni, or truth of the sign. This consists ill its adequateness or conformity to the thing signified. The truth and adequacy of signs belong to enunciation in logic.
2. Scientijic truth consists in the conformity of thoughts to things; and moral truth lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts; while lorpcal tn\t\\ depends on the self-consistency of thoughts themselves.
3. Truth, in the strict logical sense, applies to propo- sitions, and nothing else ; and consists in tiie conformity of the declaration made to the actual state of the case. In its etymological sense, truth signifies that which the speaker belieoes to be the fact. In this sense it is op- posed to a lie, and may be called moral. Truth is not unfrequently applied to arguments, when the proper expressions would be "correct,'" "conclusive," "valid." The use of truth in the sense of reality should be avoid- ed. People sjieak of the truth »r falsity oi facts; where- as, properly speaking, they are either 7-eal ov fictitious. It is the statement that is true or false.
4. Necessai-y truths are such as are known indepen- dently of inductive proof; are those in which we not only learn that the proposition is true, but that it must be true; are those the opposite of which is inconceivable, contradictory, impossible. Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to reason, we may con- ceive to be otherwise.
6. Absolute truth is the knowledge of (iod, the ground of all relartve truth and being. All relative truth is partial because each relation presupposes something which is not relative. As to us relative truth is par- tial in another sense, because the relations known to us are affected by relations which we do not know, and therefore our knowledge even as relative knowledge is incomplete as a whole and in each of its parts. At the same time, relative knowledge is real knowledge; and if it were possible habitually to realize in consciousness that it is partial, it would be strictly true so far as it goes. See Blunt, Diet, of Hist. Theol. s. v. ; Fleming, Vo- cab. of Philos. Sciences, s. v.
6. In Scripture language, eminently, God is truth; that is, in him is no fallacy, deception, perverseness, etc. Jesus Christ, being (iod, is also the truth, and is the true way to (}od, the true representative, image, character, of the Father. The H(dy Spirit is the Spirit of truth, who communicates truth, wlio maintains the truth in believers, guides tiicm in the truth, and who hates and punishes falsehood or lies, even to tlie death of the transgressor (Psa. xxxi, 5; John xiv, 6, 17; Acts v, 3, etc.).
Especially is truth a name given to the religion of
TRYPHiENA
570
TSINNIN
Jesus, in opposition to that of the Jew and tliat of the iRatlien. As contrasted witli the Jewish system, it was llic "truth" ill tlie sense of 'Teality," as distinguished from the '■emblems," symbols, representations, of that reality; from the "shadow of good things to come," contained in the Levitical law: in this sense it is that the apostle tells us "the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth caine by Jesus Christ." As contrasted with paganism. Christianity was truth opjiosed tofahe- hooil. 'i'lie heathen mythology not only was not true, but was not even sujiiwscd as true : it not only deserved no faith, but it demanded none. Jesus inaugurated a new way of propagating a religion, by inviting converts not to conform to its institutions, but to '■ believe" and to to let their actions be agreeable to truth : nothing, then, was more natural tlian that Christianity sliould receive names expressive of this grand peculiarity, the truth and the faith. See Whately, Essays on Difficulties of St. Paul, essay i.
Tryphae'na (Tpixpmya, luxurious), a person men- tioned in coiniection with 'I'ryphosa (q. v.), the two be- ing Christian women at Kome, who. among those that are enumerated in the conclusion of Paid's letter to that city, receive a special salutation, and on the special ground that they are engaged there in " laboring in the Lord" (Kom. xvi, \i). A.D. .')5. They may have been sisters, but it is more likely that they were fellow-dea- conesses, and among the predecessors of that large num- ber of otlicial women who ministered in the Church of Kome at a later period (Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. vi, 43) ; for it is to be observed that they are spoken of as at that time occupied in Christian service {rag K07ruoff(u), while the salutation to I'ersis, in the same verse, is connected with past service (//nf hKOTriaaer).
AV'e know nothing more of these two sister-workers of the apostolic time; but the name of one of them oc- curs curiously, with other names tamiliar to us in Paul's epistles, in the Apocryiihal A els of Paul and Thecla. See TiiECLA LiiGHNO. There Tryphiena appears as a rich Christian widow of Antioch, who gives Thecla a refuge in her house, and sends money to Paul for the relief of the poor (see Jones, On the Canon, ii, 371, 3JS0). It is imjiossible to discern any trace of probability in this part of the legend.