RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIA
Du Plessis-Mornay Durand
Auvergne, in the third quarter of the thirteenth century; d. at Meaux (28 m. e. of Paris) Sept. 10, 1334. He entered the Dominican order as early as 1303. In 1312 he was made a licentiate and was called to Avignon as lector curiae and magister S. Palatii, and remained there for some time. In i. His Life. 1317 he was made a bishop, in 1326 bishop of Meaux. During the last years of his life he was in opposition to John XXII. on account of his teaching of the visio beatifica, and a judicium magistrorum theologice in curia existentium declared eleven of his articles objectionable. Of his writings one only has importance, the comprehensive commentary on the " Sentences " of Peter Lombard, which he commenced, according to his own statement, while a young man and finished in his old age.
In the controversy between the scientific tendencies of his time, Durand occupied an independent critical position and adhered to no schoolauthority, a position for which he obtained the name of Doctor resolutissimus. To be sure, dogmatic statements which had become authoritative in the Church are without question authoritative for him, but he distinguishes clearly between that which is really an ecclesiastical statement and that which is commonly deduced from it,
2. Inde- the former, not the latter, being bindpendence as ing. Besides, the authority of any ina Thinker, dividual teacher must yield to good contrary reasons. Especially is this true (as he states with unmistakable reference to the colleagues of Thomas, who would make him the absolutely authoritative theologian of the order, Prcef. in sent. no. 12) with respect to every modern teacher, for " every one who dismisses reason for the sake of human authority falls into beastly unwisdom." Still more decided is Durand's position against extra-ecclesiastical authorities; " it is no part of natural philosophy to know what Aristotle or other philosophers thought, but the truth of the matter is the essential thing; wherefore when Aristotle deviates from the truth of the matter it is no science to know what Aristotle thought, but rather error " (Prwf. in sent., qu. 1, no. 6).
Like all theologians of that time, Durand has his say on the question of universalia. But his position is not clear owing to the fact that the commentary was composed during a long period, within which his views underwent development. Hence Prantl states (p. 292) only that he approaches to nominalistic views and Baur (Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, p. 377), that the premises of nominalism are found in him. Nevertheless every real entity is to him merely individual entity (II., dist. 3, qu. 3, no. 9). To be sure the general concepts are not merely nothings, since they designate congruities which are found among different things, but these congruities do not go back to something really common, therefore: " The unity of a universal in its particulars is not a unity of the thing but a unity of relationship, just as the entity is an entity of relationship " (I., dist. 19, qu. 4, no. 10; cf. II., dist. 3, qu. 3, no. 16). On this account also the much disputed question concerning the prin-
cipium individuations becomes to him null and void, because he thinks it a simple matter of fact that every thing real proceeds as such 3. Philo- from the individual and is individual sophical (II, dist 3, qu. 3, no. 15). From this Position, point of view Durand must be considered a nominalist, though this is not clear everywhere. But on the other hand it can not be said that the theological views of Durand are to be traced to his nominalism, or even to his philosophical views in general, for he does not do it himself. Only a certain corresponding tendency in his thinking on both spheres may be admitted. Durand allows his views to develop everywhere from a criticism of his predecessors, but this criticism, acute as it is, rests so little on firm pervading principles that a Durandian system can hardly be spoken of. As a Dominican he started in the first place from Thomas, but in essential points he freed himself from Thomism and pursued in many directions a like path to Scotus, without therefore becoming a Scotist. For example he does not share with him the fundamentally important position of the will before intelligence. On the question whether theology is to be considered a science, he deviates much from Thomas asserting with emphasis that for most theological statements a scientific demonstration is impossible ; he does not even admit with Scotus the possibility of a scientifically satisfactory refutation of the contrary reasons (IV., dist. 11, qu. 1, no. 6). Further considerations lead him to the result that theology is in no respect a science in the strict sense, but only in the wider sense, because one may call science a discipline which rests on true propositions, though not evident to the reasoner. On the whole in Durand may be perceived a keen apprehension of the distinction between faith and knowledge. Thomas imagined that he was able to bridge over the chasm between both, since faith, so far as it rests on divine authority appeared to him under the point of view of knowledge, and indeed of a knowledge the certainty of which is greater than that of all knowledge from natural reason (Summa, p. I., qu. 1, art. 8, ad. 2). Durand, however, says (II., dist. 23, qu. 7, no. 10) " there are many conditions of knowledge and action in us more certain and better known than faith."
Characteristic of Durand's morally serious but religiously cool mode of consideration is his answer to the question (IV., dist. 1, qu. 7) " whether sin should be more hateful to the believer because it is offensive to God or because it is hurtful to himself." The idea of offensa Dei, also that of the wrath of God, is here in substance wholly removed; both are asserted of God only secundum effectum, not secundum affectum, and by offensa Dei must not be understood a displeasure of God in the sinner or the will to punish him, for the expression is nothing more than a metaphorical designation of punishment itself, and originated by trans- 4. His ferring to God a disposition analogous Theology, to that in which the reproving man generally is. The guilt of the sinner is therefore not in the offensa Dei, but in the irregular conduct of man; such a conduct is against reason,
Durand. Durie