RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIA
Durie Duty
DUTOIT, du"twa', JEAN PHILIPPE: French mystic; b. at Moudon (14 m. n.n.e. of Lausanne), Switzerland, Sept. 27, 1721; d. at Lausanne Jan. 21, 1793. He is usually called Dutoit-Membrini, after his mother. He studied theology at the academy of Lausanne, but in 1750 he was taken ill and believed that death was near. As he lay on the ground, he had a vision in which he saw his dead father who announced to him his speedy recovery. When he rose, he heard a voice saying: " Thou shalt eat of the flesh of thy Redeemer and drink of his blood." He at once felt the effect of these words, and a few days later he was far on the way to recovery. Shortly afterward Dutoit became acquainted with the writings of Madame Guyon and was soon one of her enthusiastic admirers. He vowed never to marry, and often preached in the churches at Lausanne, where he saw rich results from his discourses, although he could not be persuaded to take a permanent position. In 1759 his health obliged him to request that his name be stricken from the clerical list, and he then devoted himself to an earnest study of the Bible and the Fathers of the Church, especially the mystics. He corresponded with the famous men of his time, and gathered about him at Lausanne a small circle of enthusiasts. Despite the injurious reports circulated concerning him, especially at Geneva, and the suspicion of the government at Bern, his influence steadily increased. After his death a number of his followers, chiefly women, entered the Catholic Church, while others returned to the State Church or joined various sects.
Dutoit's chief works were his Philosophic divine par Keleph ben Nathan (3 vols., Lyons, 1793) and Philosophie chretienne (4 vols., Lausanne, 1800), a collection of sermons published by his admirers. He also reedited the letters of Madame Guyon, and published a new edition of her works in forty volumes. Dutoit was guided in his labors by two points of view, since he opposed deism, unbelief, fanaticism, and magnetism, and strove to teach an inward and empirical Christianity as contrasted with an external faith based merely on historical belief and a superficial religious life. As in the case of mystics generally, the objective aspect of redemption, though by no means denied, was overshadowed by subjectivity, and justification by faith was not fully recognized. Dutoit accordingly disregarded the Moravians, and was equally unsympathetic with the Jansenists and Calvin. He made a laudable effort to establish the efficacy of grace, and avoided the harshness of particularism, although his system contains no satisfactory solution of the problem. He likewise rejected the certainty of the state of grace, coinciding here with Catholic doctrine. His Biblical and Protestant spirit, however, protected him from quietistic extremes. Eugene Choisy.
Bibliography: J. Chavannes, J. P Dutoit, sa vie, son caractere et ses doctrines, Lausanne, 1865; A. Verdeil, Hist, du canton de Vaud, iii. 126-128, ib. 1852; H. L. J. Heppe, Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik, p. 515, Berlin, 1875; Lichtenberger, ESR, iv. 166-169.
DUTY: The moral obligation to do or omit to do something, also any act or omission which is
perceived to be morally binding. The derivation of the word (due+ty) shows that a duty was originally thought of as something expected, or an obligation. Similarly, the derivation of the German Pflicht from the Old High German phlegan, plegan (Modern Germ, pflegen), shows an original connection of the idea with fixed custom or rule. As custom becomes law in an objective respect, so it becomes duty in a subjective respect. The doctrine of duty has formed a chief article of ethics since the earliest times. The Stoics in particular developed with peculiar care the conception of conduct in accordance with duty. They did not get beyond a eudemonistic principle, confined to this world, but still they understood by happiness a life according to nature, which they interpreted as a life in harmony with the divine reason of the universe. Cicero's work De ofjiciis rests upon that of the Stoic Panaetius. The first book treats of the honestum, the second of the utile and the third of the choice between the two. The same division and manner of treatment was adopted by Ambrose in a work of the same title. Neither of them brings to light a scientific principle and psychological motivation. Both wrote merely for practical purposes, Cicero for his son Marcus, and Ambrose for his young clergymen. However, these two works, with their superficial conceptions and accidental arrangement, formed the standard of ethics until Kant revealed the true essence of duty.
Duty is the form of ethical conduct. This form is conditioned by the law, by the unconditioned demand, " thou shalt," which through mediation by the conscience applies itself to the will of man and binds him to obedience. The consciousness of this obligation is Kant's " categorical imperative "; but Kant considered all morality as a legal fulfilment of duty, thus overlooking the radical nature of evil, which the law can repress but not eradicate. De Wette perceived this gap in Kant's system of morals and tried to bridge it over by adducing the fact of redemption. But it was Schleiermacher who, correcting the exaggeration of Kant, assigned to duty its proper place in ethics. Accordingly, the production or realization of the highest good is the moral task. Virtue is the moral power used for the performance of this task, and duty gives form to the virtuous moral action. The abnormal development of man under the dominion of sin makes the formula of duty, the law, indispensable, although it must be gradually dispensed with by the subversion of sin and the realization of the highest good.
The law defining duty becomes really moral only by its continual reference to redemption, which, by means of grace, has opened to sinful man the possibility of ethical action. In the conduct of the individual in accordance with duty there is always an additional factor besides the formula of duty as defined by the moral law. This is the " individual court of appeal," this expression being used to denote in a comprehensive sense the individual ethico-religious feeling and conscience.
In the doctrine of duties casuistry holds still a necessary place, since in practical life it is impossible to reduce moral law to an abstract formula. Ethics
Du Vergier de Hauranne Eachard