Hutchesou, Francis, called by Mackintosh the
HUTCHESON
425
HUTCHINSON
" father of speculative philosophy in Scotland," was the son of a Presbyterian minister in Ireland, and was bom Aug. 8, lOO-l. lie entered tlie University of Glasgow in iyiO, and afterwards became minister of a Presbyte- rian church in tlie north of Ireland ; but, preferring tlie study of philosophy to theology, he was induced to open a private academy at Dublin. The publication of some of his works soon procured him the friendship of many distinguished persons, and m 1729 he was called as pro- fessor of moral philosophy to the University of Glas- gow. He died in 1747. His principal works are, Phi- losophuc moralis inslitutio coinpemliaria, ethices etjurii- prmlentioi naturalis elementa continens (Glasgow, 1742, 12mo) : — A short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, con- tainimj the Elements of Ethics and the Law of Nature, translated (Glasgow, 1747, sm. 8vo) -.—An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of Passions and A_ffections (3d ed. Glasg. 1769, sm. 8vo) ; — Synopsis metaphysiae, Oidoloyi- am et Pneumatologiam complectem (editio sexta, Glasg. 1774, small 8vo) -.—An Inquiry into the Oriyinal of our Ideas of Beauty and Vii-tiie, in two treatises (5th edit, corrected, London, 1753, 8vo) : — Letters between the late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Ilutcheson conceniinrj the true Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness, etc. (Lon- don, 1735, 8vo). After his death, his System of Moi-al Philosophy was pvibhshed by his son, Francis Ilutche- son, M.D., with a sketch of his life and writings by Dr. WiUiam Leechman (Glasg. 1755, 2 vols. 4to). " In his metaphysical system Hutcheson rejected the theory of innate ideas and principles, but insisted upon the admis- sion of certain universal propositions, or, as he terms them, metaphysical axioms, which are self-evident and immutable. These axioms are primary and original, and do not derive their authority from any simpler and antecedent principle. Consequently, it is idle to seek a criterion of truth, for this is none other than reason it- self, or, in the words of Hutcheson, ' menti congenita intelligendi vis.' Of his ontological axioms two are im- portant: Everything exists really; and no quality, af- fection, or action is real, except in so far as it exists in some object or thing. From the latter proposition, it follows that all abstract affirmative propositions are hy- pothetical, that is, they invariably suppose the exist- ence of some object without which they cannot be true. Truth is divided into logical, moral, and metaphysical. Logical truth is the agreement of a proposition with the object it relates to; moral truth is the harmony of the outward act with the inward sentiments; lastly, meta- physical truth is that nature of a thing wherein it is known to God as that which actually it is, or it is its abso- lute reality. Perfect truth is in the infinite alone. The truth of finite things is imperfect, inasmuch as they are limited. It is, however, from the finite that the mind rises to the idea of absolute truth, and so forms to itself a belief that an absolute and perfect nature exists, Avhich, in regard to duration and space, is infinite and eternal. The soul, as the thinking essence, is spiritual and incor- poreal. Of its natiu-e we have, it is true, but little knowledge; nevertheless, its specific difference from body is at once attested by the consciousness. It is simple and active ; body is composite and passive. From the spiritual nature of the soul, however, Hutcheson does not derive its immortality, but makes this to rest upon the goodness and wisdom of God." In moral phi- losophy he was the first to use the term " moral sense" to denote " the faculty which perceives the morality of actions," and he held it to be an essential part of human nature. " He allows the appellation of good to those actions alone which are disinterested and flow from the prmciple of benevolence. The last lias no reference to expediency nor personal advantages, nor even to the more refined enjoyments of moral sympathy, the obli- gations of reason and truth, or of the divine will. It is a distinct and peculiar principle, a moral sentiment or instinct of great dignity and authority, and its end is to regulate the passions, and to decide, in favor of virtue, the conflict between the interested and disinterested
affections. On this foundation Hutcheson erected all the superstructure of the moral duties." See Kuylish Cyclopoidiu; Mackintosh, History of Ethical Pliilnso- phy, p. 126; Tennemann, Manual History of PJiiloso- phy, § 350 ; Stud. u. Krit. 1866, p. 406 ; Morell, JJl^tory of Mod. Phil. p. 179 sq. ; M'Cosh, Intuitions of the Mind, p. 92, 248, 411 sq.; AUibone, Diet, of Authors, i, 92(;.
Hutcheson, George, an English Biblical schol- ar, of whose early life but little is knowi, flourished about the middle "of the 17th century. He was a min- ister first at Colomonell, and later at Edmburgh, but was ejected for nonconfomiity about 1660. In 1669 he preached at Irvine, though he continued steadfastly to oppose the use of the Episcopal litiurgy. He died in 1678. He wrote. Exposition of the twelve Minor Proph- ets (Lond. 1655, sm.8vo) -.—Exposit. of John (1657, fol.) : — Exposition of Job (1669, fol.) -.—Forty-five Sermons on the loQth Psalm (Edinb. 1691, 8vo). — Kitto, Bibl. Cy- clop, ii, 345 ; AUibone, Diet, of A uihors, i, 927. (J. H. W.)