THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
and in re. Since all existence is traced back to
God, it follows that the archetypes of all things
that are have been from eternity in the
2. His divine mind. This is true also of mat- Philosophy, ter, which may be understood not only
The Rela- as ens aut nihil but also as esse in potion of tentia. What, then, is the relation of Universals the universal to the particular? Acto Particu- cording to Thomas, matter is the lars. principle of individuation. This Scotus denies, even on Thomas's view of matter as negative. For him individuation is the work of an entitas positiva, and consists in a unity which resists any further division. Now this unity can not have for its basis anything negative, since no negative can be opposed to a positive. The basis is aliquod positivum intrinsecum. The significance of the hcecceitas of an object (that which renders the object capable of being designated as " this "), or, as he elsewhere calls it, unitas signata ut hcec, or individuitas, is that in his view (which here again is opposed to Thomas's) the purpose of nature is realized in the particular. As this purpose is laid down by God, we must, in accordance with the divine ordinance, regard the individual and the particular as a higher form of existence than the universal.
In his epistemology the generally accepted Aristotelian principles naturally predominate. Knowledge is the product of the joint operation of the soul and some objectum prcesens et hoc in specie intelligibili. Though our knowledge presupposes an impression made on the senses, yet the image they receive does not create the conception; the species intelligibilis inherent in the object excites the action of the mind, which appropriates the species by abstraction. In this process of building up a conception the intellect is the " principal
3. His cause"; only the "occasion" of its Epistemol- activity is furnished by the external
ogy. world. The work of the intellect is thus to extract universals from particulars. This is not to be taken as if it were necessary to neglect all concrete sense-perception in order to attain the universal; the general must authenticate itself by the concrete. The view of Scotus is that thought, in the process of constructing terms, perceives in the phenomena of sense the universal which underlies them; and this is in the main the view of the later realists.
The primacy of the will is a dominant thought in all his philosophy. In both Aristotle and Thomas the will is moved by the intellect, which Thomas thus places higher than the will, believing that happiness is to be attained through it and not through the will. This view is strongly combated by Scotus. All knowledge, according to him, is dependent upon the operation of ex-
4. The ternal things, and man is not free in Primacy of regard to his thought; as distinguished
the Will, from the will, thought is natural, and subject to " natural necessity." If, then, thought (or the object which determines the thought) caused the act of the will, an affirmative act of the will would be explicable enough, but not the simultaneous possibility of a negative act, since
a " natural agent " can produce only one effect. The will, therefore, must be the sole cause of its decisions. If this were not the case, natural actions would not be free, and there would be no room for merit or demerit as applied to the will.
This view postulates the possibility of things happening freely and by chance, which is a fact of experience. Scotus does not deny that the intellect cooperates with the will, or that intellectual notions influence every act of the will. He means only that the actual volition is the work of the free will, the intellect playing merely the part of a causa subserviens. From this proposition he deduces consequences opposed to the Thomist views. Acts of the will are on a higher plane than acts of the intellect. The fact that it is the will which is attacked by the corruption of sin is an additional demonstration of its primacy; and in like manner happiness is enjoyed primarily not by the understanding but by the will. In a word, the purpose of being is realized by the exercise of free, personal will.
The theology of Scotus presupposes a revelation, which teaches man the aim to be sought by his will and the means of reaching it. These necessary truths are taught by Scripture, whose credibility is demonstrated at length, and contained in summary in the Apostles' Creed, or in the three ancient creeds, and in addition to these in the authority of the "authentic Father" and the "Roman Church." Since the Church has determined the canon, submission to the authority of Scripture involves submission to the Church, which " ap-
5. Revela- proves and authorizes " the Scriptural tion and books. The decision of the Roman
the Church. Church pronounces a doctrine orthodox or heretical. Even when a doctrine has no other authority or rational foundation, it must be accepted on the single authority of the Church. The way is thus paved for the ecclesiastical positivism of later scholasticism. The whole body of positive and practical truths offered by theology is apprehended by faith.
He reaches his conception of God by endeavoring to show, from the standpoints of causality, finality, and eminentia, the necessity of an Ens infinitum, having no external cause or end and no superior. Considering God as the primum efficiens and per se agens, he reaches some useful positive conclusions, proving at length that this primum efficiens must possess intelligence and will. What God wills, he wills only because he wills it. He does not will the good because it is good, but good is good because he wills it. The absolute power
6. Concep- of God has theoretically only one tion of God. limit, that of the logically impossible;
in practise it is limited, in accordance with what he actually has willed or wills, to a potentia ordinata. The sum of the relations of God to the world may be designated as love, which embraces the entire creation, present and potential. All creation forms a whole, whose individual parts rank according to their relation to their end of being; and this relation determines the degree of the divine love given to each. As God finds the end of his being in himself, he loves himself first — then men,