RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIA
Buns Scotus
in so far as they are in immediate relation to this end.
The sinlessness of man in Paradise was theoretically only potential, since the will includes the possibility of sinning. The real sinlessness of the first man therefore involves a " superadded gift," the imparted supernatural " habit " of grace, by which alone he was able to subject his lower powers to his higher. Since concupiscence, or the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, belongs to the original nature of man, it can not be the basis of orig-
7. Doctrine inal sin, which is rather to be desof Sin. ignated as " the lack of original
righteousness." Concupiscence is the natural material of original sin, but only becomes sin when the frenum cohibens is removed. Scotus is thus led into the denial of the physical transmission of original sin. Just as the will can not bring about a metamorphosis of the natural constitution, so an inherited physical constitution can not change the will. The redemption of man from sin stands for Scotus upon quite another basis. In so far as justitia originalis was imparted to Adam and his posterity, it was a justitia debita; and the will of each of his descendants has the same debt. Physical generation comes into question only in that by it we are made children of Adam and placed under the ideal obligation to this justitia. This doctrine strikes at the root of the Augustinian theory of original sin; it replaces the physical transmission of sinful concupiscence by the ideal obligation of every child of Adam to the supernatural righteousness originally imparted to the first man.
In his treatment of redemption, Scotus denies that the merits of Christ are infinite. Their basis is in the obedience rendered by him, which is the act of his human will; and as that will is finite, so the merits acquired by its act must be finite. The eternal divine predestination embraces in itself, as the means to its accomplishment, the meritorious Passion of Christ. The death of Christ acquires its unique value in virtue of the divine will which has ordained this means and purposed to accept it as sufficient for the redemption of humanity. Here comes in the question made familiar by Auselm — whether the precise form of the Passion
was necessary to redemption; and this
8. Redemp- question leads Scotus to a criticism
tion. of Anselm's theory. He denies the absolute necessity of satisfaction, which was only necessary so far as God willed it, which he was not bound to do. But even if the necessity of satisfaction is admitted, it does not follow that it must be made by God, since it is not true that a satisfaction exceeding in value that of all creation must have been offered. The value of the redeeming act is not in the thing offered, but in its acceptance by the divine will. Christ, seeing the sinfulness of the Jews and their perverted devotion to the Law, desired " to recall them from error by his words and deeds." He taught them the truth, and, in the execution of this task, died for righteousness, considering his Passion the most effective means of winning men back to God through love. So far this doctrine of satisfaction follows
in the main the type represented by Abelard. How Scotus conceived the objective side of the Atonement is seen in another passage, where he says that God would not forgive sin unless something was offered to him which pleased him more than sin displeased him; and this could only be the obedience of a person whom he loved more than he would have loved humanity had it not sinned. This was Christ, in return for whose obedience and love God showed mercy to the human race. The imparting of the grace of God is thus the result of the merits of Christ. By the word grace in the ordinary sense of gratia creata Scotus understands the divinely-imparted " habit " of love, which inclines the human will to meritorious acts. Grace is " a principle cooperating " with the will. With such cooperation, man would have to be supposed capable of performing meritorious acts ex solis naturalibus, which would be a Pelagian assumption. There must be a supernatural form imprinting its character upon human action, without forcing it and thus taking away all merit; and through this " habit " not only the single act but the whole man becomes acceptable to God.
Like most medieval theologians, Scotus considered the imparting of grace as inseparably attached to the sacraments, which are given to men in virtue of the Passion of Christ as the " most perfect meritorious cause of grace." Apart from the general questions as to the nature of sacraments, the most interesting thing in his treatment is his discussion of the relation between the divine and earthly factors in the sacraments. Since the 9. The Sac- grace which is imparted to man by a raments. sacrament can only come into being through a creative act, and creation in that sense is impossible to man, it follows that the gift of grace in the sacrament is the result of the direct operation of God, not of priestly action. On their human or external side, the sacraments are symbolic acts, which typify the accompanying divine operation within the soul. But these symbols are sure and operative, since God has promised to accompany their use with the effect which they symbolize. He thus defines a sacrament as "a symbol cognizable by the senses, efficaciously signifying by divine institution the grace of God or the effect of God's gracious operation, ordained for the salvation of man in this life." There can then be no question of an indwelling of supernatural power in the sacraments; they are not in themselves " causes of grace," but can be so called only because the symbols are secure evidences of the corresponding operations of grace, while God's will is the sole cause of grace, which he creates directly in the soul. This view had already been clearly stated by Bonaventura, and through Scotus it came to dominate the theology of the later Middle Ages.
The historical importance of the general teaching of Scotus can scarcely be overestimated. He brought the scholastic method to its highest point. His brilliant dialectic, his acuteness of insight, the earnestness of his criticism, and the carefulness of his demonstration set an example which has sel-
Duns Scotus Du Perron