THE NEW SCIIAFF-HERZOG
freedom and moral law. Originally the word for guilt signified a debt, then the liability for debt, still later it stood for crime and the state of one who had violated custom or law without reference to the ideal nature of these, as liable to punishment. With reference to the law of God, guilt was the condition of one who having transgressed the law was liable to penalty. In the Old Testament guiltofferings were coupled with sin-offerings, both of which assumed violation of the covenant relations which demanded atonement. It involved the assumption that legal requirement, not so much personal as arbitrary and external, had been disturbed and that satisfaction had to be made. This idea has its ethnic parallels. In Roman law culpa designates the transgression of law where no dolus can be attributed to the conscious intention. Aitia, which stood for cause, meant also guilt; even heroes lay under a burden of guilt which could not be ethically attributed to them; hence it appears as a fate — haimarmene. The German Skulda was one of the fates. The earliest Christian term for guilt was not aitia but opheilema, "debt" (cf. Matt. vi. 12).
Guilt thus appears in two relations — civil and personal. In civil affairs one may come under obligations to compensate for an action legally defective, by the payment of money or other equivalent. By a criminal act, in addition to the injury done, the criminal has violated a social order for which the only satisfaction is punishment; this, while not repaying the injured party, compels a recognition of the order violated. Here the relation is no longer external, involving debt and things, but personal, involving crime and persons. Thus the necessity of punishment cleaves to the transgressor. According to the New Testament guilt has the following relations: (1) to the object violated by the sin (I Cor. xi. 27; Jas. ii. 10); (2) to the sin with which it is connected (Mark iii. 29); (3) to the penalty to which the evil-doer is liable (Matt. xxvi. 66); (4) to the person to whose jurisdiction one is answerable on the ground of violated obligation (Rom. iii. 19).
Several theories have been proposed to account for the consciousness of guilt: (1) It is grounded in part in the participation of all men in Adam's sin, and in part in the corruption which is the punishment of that sin. (2) A blameworthy deed committed by each individual of the race in a prenatal state announces itself in the universal consciousness of guilt (Julius M idler). (3) The consciousness of guilt is an incident of human development; "in his direct and unformed condition, man is in a situation in which he ought not to be, and he must free himself. This is the meaning of the doctrine of original sin." This condition is therefore inevitable, but to be transcended, and with its disappearance guilt will also disappear (Hegel); or through the painful — guilty — consciousness of natural weakness as something that should not be, one becomes susceptible to redemption by which he attains perfection (Schleiermacher) . (4) Guilt is a social phenomenon. All men are involved in the general consequences and sufferings caused by sin. This is the truth contained in the doctrine of origi-
nal sin. Men may be only in part aware of this state and later they may be awakened from their indifference and lethargy and be led to confess and forsake their blameworthy share in a general immoral and irreligious condition. So far at least as they consent to those social conditions which violate the ideal moral order they are guilty. But the line between individual and social guilt is hard to define. (5) Guilt attaches only to those actions and to that character which are self-originated and for which one is therefore responsible. He has freely identified himself with the moral conditions in which he is found. Accordingly he is out of tune with the moral order of the world, society, and his own better self. His acts become habitual, his choice cumulative, registered in a permanent alienation from God. And the wrong act has not only its outer, but its inner consequences, and these latter cleave to the sinner and he is answerable to God. This constitutes his guilt. The prophets, in their revolt from the earlier Hebrew notion of sin as derived from social solidarity, carried the idea of individual sin and guilt to the very breakingpoint (Jer. xxxi. 29, 30: Ezek. xviii. 2, 4, 9, xxxiii. 12-20). In personal life there may be guilt where there is no immediate consciousness of it. There are degrees of guilt, but no guilt is infinite. Strictly speaking, there is neither inheritance nor transfer of guilt. C. A. Beckwith.
Bibliography: The subject is treated in the treatises on systematic theology (see Dogma, Dogmatics); in the works on Biblical Theology (q.v.); and in the commentaries on the passages cited in the text. Consult also the literature under Sin; J. Miiller, Die christliche Lehre von der Silnde, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1877, Eng. transl., Edinburgh, 1877; DCG, i. 696-698.
GUITMUND, gwit'mund, CHRISTIAN: Bishop of Aversa (13 m. n.n.w. of Naples); b. in Normandy, probably c. 1020; d. about 1095. He was instructed by Lanfranc at Bee. Later he was a monk in the monastery of La-Croix Saint^Leufroi in the diocese of Evreux (department of Eure, between Gaillon and Evreux). Thence William the Conqueror called him to England after the battle of Senlac (Oct. 14, 1066), with the intention of offering him later an English bishopric, but he could not induce Guitmund to remain. At the beginning of 1077 he was in Rome, where he entered a monastery under the name of Christianus. He soon gained great influence at the papal court. In an account of the events in Rome in Dec, 1083, he appears as the leader of the Gregorian party. After the death of Gregory he vehemently opposed the election of Victor III. (pope 1086-87), but was more favorably inclined toward Urban II. (1088-99). To him he owed his election as bishop of Aversa, about July, 1088.
Guitmund's fame rests upon his attack on Berengar of Tours and his formulation of the common doctrine of the Lord's Supper in his Libri tres dc corporis et sanguinis Domini veritate in eucharistia. The work originated between 1073 and 1078, probably in La-Croix-Saint-Leufroi, and aims to refute Berengar's book Des acra cwna. Guitmund tries
(1) to prove from the conception of divine omnipotence the possibility of the "essential" change;
(2) to confute the esthetic objection to the idea of